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ABSTRACT 
Although existing cross-border M&A research suggests that national pride is associated 
with higher bid premiums, the underlying rationale behind these national pride bids is unclear. 
We study two plausible explanations for this phenomenon: payment for a prearranged expansion 
strategy (real options) and bidders’ lack of experience in a target country (organization learning). 
Using a sample of cross-border acquisitions of developed-country targets by developing-country 
acquirers, we perform an extensive media search to identify 36 acquisitions that involve national 
pride. We divide these 36 acquisitions into those with zero bids completed in that particular 
country prior to the national pride bid (non-foothold bidders) and those with at least one bid 
completed in that country before the national pride acquisition (foothold bidders). We find that 
the higher premium paid in so-called national pride bids is primarily attributable to the non-
foothold acquirers. Since non-foothold characteristics can proxy for either lack of experience or 
higher value of embedded real options, or both, we perform further tests which confirm that the 
higher premium of national pride bids can be attributed to both channels, supporting both 
organizational learning theory and real options explanation. We further demonstrate that national 
pride acquirers underperform operationally post-acquisition, and such underperformance is also 
attributable to the non-foothold acquirers. One explanation for this finding is the lack of prior 
acquisition experience of non-foothold bidders. 
JEL Classifications: F23, G34, L25  
Keywords: cross-border acquisition, national-pride, foothold, bid premium, real options, 
organizational learning theory 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Worldwide acquisition activities come in waves, and the latest peak occurred in 2007, 
when the value of global acquisitions rocketed to a record high of $4.5 trillion (Reus & Lamont, 
2009). One of the major drivers for this growth is cross-border acquisitions. Specifically, in 
terms of dollar value, the proportion of cross-border acquisitions has increased dramatically from 
about 27% in 2002 to 45% in 2007 (Erel, Liao, & Weisbach, 2012). The main reason for this 
upward trend is that corporations from developed nations have been increasingly seeking low 
labor cost and searching for new markets overseas. These corporations often find it easier to 
achieve this goal by acquiring firms in developing countries. However, the acquisitions made by 
firms from developing nations targeting firms located in developed nations have emerged as a 
significant trend in recent years. According to the World Investment Report 2013, for firms in 
developing countries, merger and acquisition (M&A henceforth) is a major mode of entry into 
developed-country markets. This report also documented an increasing involvement of emerging 
economies in worldwide cross-border acquisitions. The fraction of M&A originating from 
emerging economies rose from 8% to 40% in terms of dollar value and from 5% to 20% in terms 
of the number of deals from 1990 to 2012.
1
 
In the cross-border merger wave of 2007, a noticeable characteristic is a series of high-
profile acquisitions that involve developing-country bidders and developed-country targets. A 
portion of these deals not only generates media hype but also evokes national discussion, 
involves political interventions during the acquisition process, or has significant social impact 
after the acquisition. Some typical examples include the national acquisition of Nexen by 
                                                 
1 Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 
2013, Annex Tables 10 and 12. 
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CNOOC in 2013, the acquisition of Arcelor by Mittal Steel in 2006, and the acquisition of Corus 
(United Kingdom) by India’s Tata Steel in 2006. While most of the CEOs of these developing-
country acquirers claimed that synergies, market penetration or diversifications are the reasons 
for the oversea expansion, some media evidence suggests that nationalistic considerations might 
have had an impact on the price they paid for the targets. In the case of Tata Steel acquiring 
Corus, media articles suggest that the CEO of the acquiring company might have been under the 
influence of national pride. In an article published in Associated Press Newswires on October 
20
th
 2006, the following was reported:
 
 
“For India, Tata Steel's US$8-billion bid for European steel maker Corus Group Plc. is 
more than just a corporate takeover. It's added to a sense of national pride that seems to be 
growing as fast as the country's economy, and business leaders here said Friday, as news of the 
bid spread, that it would boost the confidence of other Indian firms seeking to go global.” 2 
In an interview in 2007, Ratan Tata, the Chairman of Tata Steel, defended the move as a 
rational decision; in his own words, “Those who accuse us of having paid too much are making a 
very short sighted judgment. We have to think globally. Corus provided Tata with a good take-off 
position in Europe, and the link-up had turned the relatively small Tata Steel into a global player 
in the consolidating steel sector." (See Indo-Asian News Service, April 6
th
, 2007).
3
 Perhaps, 
national pride alone was not the underlying driver of this expensive bid; there might have been a 
rational strategic component to it as well. Another similar example is the acquisition of 
Southdown (US) by Cemex (Mexico). On one hand, the media indicates an influence of national 
pride: “For years, US and European multinationals have gobbled up Latin American companies 
                                                 
2Article Title:  Tata Steel's Corus bid boosts confidence of Indian businesses, adds to national pride. Source: 
Factiva database.  
3 Article title: Indian magnate Ratan Tata defends Corus takeover. Source: Factiva database. 
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in their quest for high-growth markets. Now, the direction has shifted. In November, Mexico's 
Cemex, the world's third-largest cement maker, bought Houston-based Southdown, the second-
largest US cement producer…Lorenzo Zambrano, Cemex's CEO, said in October that the 
company was interested in striking a ’balance between our developed and developing-country 
markets’.” (See Latin Finance December 1st, 2000).4 On the other hand, the CEO also revealed 
the firm’s strategic motive behind this acquisition. According to his statement, "This 
combination will not only expand our presence in the United States, but help us compete more 
effectively in all our markets. Integrating Southdown into a company with the scale and 
resources to prosper in a rapidly consolidating, global industry will create value for our 
shareholders." (See Business Wire, Sept 29, 2000).
5
 
When it comes to explaining the high bid premium in M&A, the hubris hypothesis is 
commonly cited in the finance literature (Roll 1986; Hayward & Hambrick 1997). This 
hypothesis suggests that CEOs tend to overestimate their ability to run the target firm, thereby 
overestimating its value. In other words, the CEOs’ individual pride may explain the 
overpayment. Recent literature suggests that external forces may contribute to CEOs’ decision to 
acquire some firms by elevating their pride to such a level that there remains no room to look 
back. One such external force suggested by the literature is national pride. Hope et al. (2011) 
define national pride as “an indication that national, social, or political considerations could 
influence decision-making of individual decision-makers (business owners or managers), either 
rationally or irrationally” (page 131).  
National pride, which could be considered as an extension of the hubris hypothesis, may 
be a reasonable motive behind M&A. However, it cannot be ruled out that while some managers 
                                                 
4 Article title: Cemex Strengthens the Mix. Author: Mark Piper. Source: Factiva database. 
5 Article title: Cemex to Acquire Southdown in US$2.8 Billion Transaction. Source: Factiva database. 
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may be perceived to display national pride, they are in fact rational economic agents. In this case, 
what is termed as national pride in the existing literature (Hope et al., 2011) may simply be an 
ex-post public reaction to high profile merger activities, while national pride has no effect on 
managerial decision processes in designing the bid price ex-ante. The bid price in the latter 
situation may rather be an outcome of other real economic motives that bring added synergies 
and/or options, such as an option to expand (including but not limited to the option to gain access 
to new markets, access to new resources, access to cheaper financing, the option to bid on 
government contracts) or simply to gain experience and build networks in new markets as a part 
of a larger expansion strategy. The value of such options may be substantial for firms if these 
options allow firms to gain access to a target country’s financial markets, enhance their 
informational advantage, and aid in building up credible business contacts. Apart from this, in 
some countries, there could be home or firm size bias in granting government contracts. 
Therefore, having an established business in that country increases a firm’s ability to 
successfully bid on such contracts. Many countries including, but not limited to the United States, 
Australia, New Zealand and Canada, have explicit price preference for domestic suppliers over 
foreign suppliers when awarding government contracts (McAeff & McMillan, 1989). Therefore, 
we posit that the high merger premium paid for so-called national pride bids may simply be 
motivated by the firms’ desire to establish themselves in these markets and to further expand.  
To estimate the value of aforementioned options that could be embedded in national pride 
acquisitions, we divide national pride acquirers into two groups, those with prior acquisitions in 
the target country and those without them. For simplicity, we label those acquirers with prior 
acquisitions as foothold acquirers, and those without prior acquisitions as non-foothold group. 
An acquirer is identified as a “non-foothold acquirer” if national pride acquisition is its first 
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acquisition in a new target country. An acquirer is identified as a “foothold acquirer” if it has 
completed at least one acquisition in the target country prior to the given national-pride 
acquisition.
6
 Many studies suggest that the option value ingrained in the first or first few 
acquisitions in a target country is substantially larger than that of subsequent acquisitions (Collan 
& Kinnunen, 2009; Bernardo & Chowdhry, 2002; Smit, 2001). For example, for a firm starting 
to set foot into a new market, or for the non-foothold acquirers, the value of options to expand is 
likely to be larger compared to that of a firm with a mature network in that particular market. 
This implies that firms with prior established business or with multiple acquisitions completed in 
a target country may already have exhausted such options, as in the case of the foothold 
acquirers. What we are trying to argue, from a rational perspective, is that the value of national 
pride acquisition is not the same for all bidders: some are worth more than others based on the 
value of real options they supposedly possess. This leads to our first argument which raises the 
question of whether the overpayment for national pride perceived from the media is actually 
price paid for a package of real options that builds on the initial acquisition by expanding 
through internal growth or further acquisitions.  
As an extension to the option-based valuation argument, we also offer additional analysis 
based on organizational learning theory from the economics and management literature. This 
theory also suggests that the non-foothold acquirers, namely those without prior acquisition 
experience in the target country, are more likely to pay a higher premium in the national pride 
acquisition. From the learning perspective, the foothold or non-foothold characteristic is a proxy 
for prior acquisition experience. Organizational learning theory suggests that experienced 
                                                 
6  The “foothold” concept we construct is fundamentally different from the “toehold” concept, which 
describes the open market purchase of a small percentage of target firms’ share prior to the acquisition 
announcement.   
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acquirers will pay a lower premium as the insights gained from prior acquisitions allow them to 
have better judgment about the appropriate premium paid. In a cross-border M&A study, Collins 
et al. (2009) suggest considering the context of business environment when measuring 
acquisition experience. According to Collins et al. (2009), the country-specific acquisition 
experience has higher predictive power on the likelihood of subsequent cross-border acquisitions 
than general cross-border acquisition experience. The foothold and non-foothold concepts we 
construct are essentially proxies for acquisition experience specific to a target country and are 
consistent with Collins et al. (2009). We expect that the foothold position gives an acquirer an 
edge to learn from a brand new market and puts the acquirer in a better position when the 
expansion opportunity emerges. That is, the learning process in the same target country makes 
experienced acquirers, relative to novice acquirers, better bargainers when negotiating the 
premium paid. In summary, we posit that higher premiums paid for some national pride 
acquisitions could be attributed either to their option value or to bidders’ lack of acquisition 
experience, or to both. 
We are also interested in the post-acquisition operating performance of national pride 
acquirers. Existing literature demonstrates a negative relationship between premiums paid and 
post-acquisition performance (Hayward & Hambrick 1997, Sirower 1997). Therefore, we expect 
acquirers engaged in national pride bids to underperform relative to those not engaged in national 
pride bids as high premiums paid signals poor post-acquisition performance. If the national pride 
acquirers underperform, another question that intrigues us is whether the underperformance of 
national pride acquirers is mainly attributed to the non-foothold acquirers. Organizational 
learning theory again suggests that non-foothold acquirers are more likely to underperform due 
to lack of integration experience in the post-acquisition period.  
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We examine our research questions by using a sample of cross-border acquisitions 
originating from 20 developing countries to acquire targets in 11 developed countries. We first 
start by replicating the findings of Hope et al. (2011). We test whether the acquirers in bids that 
display national pride characteristics (“national-pride bids” or “national pride acquisitions” 
hereafter), compared with those involved in bids that do not show such a characteristic (“non-
national-pride bids” or “non-national-pride acquisitions” thereafter), pay a higher premium.7 
Consistent with Hope et al. 2011, we find that the premium in the national-pride acquisitions 
involving developing country bidders and developed country targets is higher compared to that 
of acquisitions not displaying national pride. We then divide national-pride acquirers into the 
non-foothold group and the foothold group, and examine whether non-foothold acquirers are 
paying higher premiums for higher option value and/or for lack of experience. We find that the 
overpayment by national-pride acquirers can be mainly attributed to non-foothold acquirers. We 
further find that national pride acquirers with more acquisition experience pay a lower 
acquisition premium, which supports organizational learning theory. We also find that among the 
high-premium and low-premium national pride bidder group, the former group has more future 
acquisitions completed in both the target country and all developed countries, which also 
supports the real options explanation: for those firms without prior acquisitions, the national 
pride acquisition is their first step towards further acquisitions and therefore they are more likely 
to place a premium on these acquisitions.  
 In post-acquisition performance tests, we find that the national-pride acquirers generally 
underperform the non-national-pride acquirers. Further analysis reveals that the 
underperformance of national-pride acquirers could be attributed to the non-foothold acquirers. 
                                                 
7  We do not distinguish among “bids”, “deals” and “acquisitions” and refer them in this paper 
interchangeably. 
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These findings support organizational learning theory that lack of prior acquisition experience is 
associated with underperformance in the post-acquisition period. These results also suggest a 
superior entry pattern in cross-border acquisitions, which is to initially acquire targets that are 
relatively small in size before conducting acquisitions of dominant and large-size targets (usually 
the targets of national-pride-driven acquisitions). Such an entry strategy is superior to the 
strategy of choosing a dominant or large-size firm as the target of the first acquisition for two 
reasons. Firstly, taking on a smaller target as an entry into a new market requires lower 
irreversible cost of simply putting a foot into a new market, compared to taking on a large target. 
Therefore, choosing a small-size target reduces the downside risk of an acquisition, which is the 
risk to divest a failed target. Secondly, the unique knowledge acquired through past acquisitions 
provides an acquirer with better insights into the choice of future targets, choice of the 
appropriate bid price, and choice of an appropriate post-merger integration strategy. Such 
insights dramatically improve the chance of success in an oversea acquisition.     
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that provides empirical evidence 
supporting the real options explanation in the M&A literature. We also contribute by bringing 
forward the non-foothold (foothold) concept in cross-border M&A to capture the difference in 
country-specific acquisition experiences and difference in the option value of an acquisition. 
This is also the first paper that investigates acquirers’ post-merger performance of national-pride-
driven acquisitions. Another contribution is, in the context of cross-border expansions, we 
explore the benefits of obtaining a foothold position prior to conducting an acquisition of 
industry leaders (mostly the targets of national-pride-driven acquisitions) when entering a new 
market. Our results support the real options explanation as well as organizational learning theory. 
Our findings imply that, in the context of cross-border M&A, additional option value is 
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contained in the first acquisition relative to subsequent acquisitions. Smit (2001) proposes a 
similar view that firms should not ignore the substantial option value associated with the initial 
acquisition (or the platform acquisition as the author states) when a firm enters a new 
geographical area. Our findings provide empirical support to this theory as well as insights into 
the magnitude of option value. These findings also complement organizational learning theory 
by emphasizing the importance of country context when generalizing previous acquisition 
experience to future acquisitions.  
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 discusses the research 
questions and provides a review of related literature. Chapter 3 describes the data selection 
process, sample size and variables construction. Empirical results are presented in Chapter 4, 
while Chapter 5 concludes this study and makes suggestions for future research.  
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2 BACKGROUND LITERATURE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
2.1 National Pride and Bid Premium 
In the M&A literature, the “hubris hypothesis” or “the winner’s curse” phenomenon was 
first proposed by Roll (1986) to explain the frequently documented overpayment phenomenon in 
M&A. The hubris hypothesis simply states that acquiring CEOs tend to overestimate their ability 
to run the new target company, and therefore are willing to pay a price that is too high. That is to 
say, it is the CEOs’ “individual pride” (hubris) in the acquiring firm that causes the overpayment 
for the target firm.  
Hope et al. (2011) consider national pride as a source of pride beyond “individual 
pride/hubris” that could drive up acquisition premiums in cross-border acquisitions, where the 
ownership of a firm is transferred from one nation to the other. Although national pride and its 
related concepts are relatively new to the finance literature, broader economics and marketing 
literature shows that national pride affects individuals’ decision making (Muller-Peters, 1998; 
Balabanis & Diamantopoulos, 2004; Kwak, Jaju, & Larsen, 2006). In an examination of the 
attitude towards the Euro currency, Muller-Peters (1998) discovers a negative relationship 
between the national pride score and the attitude towards Euro currency across European 
countries. According to Muller-Peters (1998), the national pride score, which is extracted from 
the survey in the project of `Psychology of the European Monetary Union in 1997 (one year 
before the announcement of European Monetary Union formation by 11 out of 15 EU countries), 
is a measure of nationalism level that represents the individuals’ superiority feeling towards 
one’s own country. National pride also manifests itself in the form of domestic country product 
bias, which affects the preference pattern of consumers. The domestic product bias suggests that 
consumers, under the influence of national pride, loyalty and patriotism, tend to choose products 
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produced by domestic firms even though the quality or price of these products is inferior to 
foreign products (Zhang, 1996). Such preference for home-country products by individual 
consumers has been documented in the United Kingdom (Balabanis & Diamantopoulos, 2004), 
the US, South Korea and India (Kwak, Jaju, & Larsen, 2006).    
Besides the evidence from economics and marketing literature, national pride also 
influences individuals’ financial decision making. In an examination of portfolio deployment in 
domestic and foreign markets, Morse (2011) finds that countries with a higher degree of national 
pride tend to have bigger proportion invested in home-country equities instead of foreign-country 
equities. Morse’s measure of national pride is based on the World Values Survey of 53 countries.   
From the perspective of psychology, national pride is a result of national identity. As 
Ellemers et al. (2002) suggest, existing research has illustrated that people’s social identities 
could strongly influence their individual identity, perceptions, emotion and, in certain situations, 
even their behavior. In the context of cross-border acquisitions, CEOs of the acquiring firm 
naturally belong to the social group of their country. Therefore, the individual managerial 
behavior could be impacted by this collective identity, and such collective identify could be 
manifested through CEOs’ individual decisions in the process of acquisition. 
The above literature provides two bases for considering national pride as a factor in 
influencing acquisition premiums in cross-border M&A. First, the above-mentioned evidence 
from psychology, economics, marketing and financial markets suggests that national pride, 
resulting from national identity, could have an impact on individuals’ perceptions, decision 
making and behavior. Therefore, such influence could be extended to cross-border M&A, where 
national pride may affect the acquisition outcome through the influence on high-level 
management of acquiring firms. Second, national pride is naturally seen as an extension of 
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individual hubris, and is expected to elevate the acquisition premium, as the hubris hypothesis 
predicts. Consequently, we start by replicating the relationship between national pride and the 
acquisition premium as in Hope et al. (2011) and expect similar results as follows: In 
acquisitions of developed-country targets by developing-country acquirers, the bid premium is 
higher in cases where the transaction displays “national pride” characteristics.  
2.2 Real options explanation and organizational learning theory in cross-border M&A 
While we note that national pride sentiments influence the decision making process of 
managers in acquiring firms, another possible explanation could be that the national pride in 
some of the acquisitions might have been merely an ex-post market reaction to these eye-
catching acquisitions captured by the media. In the latter case, the national pride captured by the 
media may have no impact on CEOs’ decision making in the acquisition process. In other words, 
the national pride on the surface may conceal the true rational or economic motive of acquiring 
firms behind their action of paying extremely high premiums for the targets. One of the possible 
explanations is that these overpayments could be the price paid for real options associated with 
breaking into a new market as the first step of their long-term strategic plan.  
The concept of “real option” is first brought forward by Myers (1977), who suggests that 
a firm’s value should be composed of two parts, the value of real assets and the value of real 
options (or the value of possibilities). In the case of acquisitions, such options include, but are 
not limited to the option to expand into this new country through scaling up existing product 
lines or investing in multi-segment businesses, the option to access cheaper financing than what 
they might be able to access domestically, the option to gain access to new resources, as well as 
the option to access government contracts where home country bias exists. For most countries, it 
is common practice to favor domestic agents over foreign agents when issuing government 
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contracts (Branco, 1994). Even with the help of WTO to promote multilateral trade, the progress 
on eliminating discrimination in government procurement is still relatively slow (Evenett & 
Hoekman, 2005). 
Furthermore, in cross-border M&A, the strategic value embedded in the initial 
acquisition is substantial when this acquisition is considered as the first step of a long-term 
strategic expansion plan, or as the prerequisite for future interrelated investments. For instance, 
Lenovo’s global expansion would not have been so successful without the support gained 
through its initial acquisition, the acquisition of IBM’s personal computer business in 2005. This 
initial acquisition not only enabled its speedy increase in global market share from 3% in 2004 to 
4.1% in 2006 but also facilitated follow-on acquisitions, including the bids for IBM server 
business and Motorola Mobility.
8
 From another perspective, the value of options associated with 
the initial acquisition is likely to be larger relative to that of follow-on acquisitions because firms 
with multiple acquisitions completed in the target country may have already exhausted their 
option to expand. Smit (2009) argues that these acquisition-associated options have value 
because of uncertainty regarding future investments. When the uncertainty is resolved, the 
follow-on investments are either abandoned or executed depending on the circumstances. The 
first acquisition also provides option value because it serves as a prerequisite in a chain of 
interrelated acquisitions. That is, the initial merger helps the firm line up subsequent mergers. In 
these cases, the merger premium for subsequent bids would likely be lower than that of the first 
bid. The above literature leads to our research question #1: is the overpayment of national-pride 
bids mainly attributed to the non-foothold acquirers? As the previous studies suggest, option 
value is the greatest when an acquiring firm enters a new country or geographical area for the 
                                                 
8 Data source: Euromonitor Global Market Information Database (GMID).  
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first time, as in the case of non-foothold acquirers. Therefore, we expect that among the two 
types of national pride acquirers, the non-foothold acquirers group is likely to pay a higher 
premium as a price paid for a package of real options in their initial acquisition. 
However, apart from the real options perspective, the high premium paid by the non-
foothold acquirers can also be explained from organizational learning theory as the non-foothold 
characteristic is also a proxy for inexperience. Organizational learning theory has been widely 
studied in the management and economics literature. According to Dodgson (1993), 
organizational learning can be described as “the ways firms build, supplement and organize 
knowledge and routines around their activities and within their cultures, and adapt and develop 
organizational efficiency by improving the use of the broad skills of their workforces” (p. 2). 
More importantly, March (1991) emphasizes the importance of “experience” in shaping learning 
and argues that the experience of dividing resources and the distribution of consequences across 
time and space affects the lesson learned. In the context of M&A, organizational learning theory 
suggests that organizations learn from their past acquisition experience. According to Bruton et 
al. (1994), the experienced acquirers know when to acquire and when not to, and know more 
than inexperienced acquirers about the key factors for successful integration. In comparison, 
inexperienced acquirers tend to have unreasonable judgments about the price they pay for the 
target firm due to a lack of experience in price negotiation and a lack of knowledge in searching 
for an under-priced target.  
In the cross-border M&A, country-specific experience is a stronger indicator for future 
acquisition activities in that particular country than general cross-border acquisition experience. 
Collins et al. (2009) claim that learning from prior acquisitions is more applicable to future 
acquisitions in that same country than it is in a different country. Stated differently, the transfer 
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of experience depends on the similarity of environments (Finkelstein & Haleblian, 2002). For 
instance, due to substantial differences in legal systems in these countries, prior knowledge about 
Japan's legal system that a bidder gains through prior acquisitions is more readily transferable to 
subsequent acquisitions in Japan than those in a different country such as the US. Collins et al. 
(2009) also find that the cross-border acquisition experience in one country signals a higher 
likelihood of subsequent acquisitions in that same country, whereas general cross-border 
acquisition experience across all countries does not. As such, the foothold or non-foothold 
concepts we construct are also good proxies for country-specific cross-border acquisition 
experience and we expect that a lack of such experience will lead non-foothold acquirers to pay a 
higher premium in national-pride-driven acquisitions. 
While both real options perspective and organizational learning perspective can provide 
reasonable explanations for the higher premium paid by the non-foothold acquirers, we are 
unable to tell which perspective is correct or whether both might be correct. In order to address 
this concern, we conduct further tests to confirm the validity of each perspective individually. 
This forms our research question #2: does organizational learning theory explain the higher 
premium paid by non-foothold acquirers? If the higher premium is a result of lacking prior 
acquisition experience, as organizational learning theory predicts, we expect that the more prior 
experience a national pride acquirer has, the less premium they will pay in national pride 
acquisitions, and vice versa. Testing the validity of real options explanation leads to our research 
question #3: does real option reasoning explain the higher premium paid by non-foothold 
acquirers? If the high premium is actually paid for higher option value embedded, then we expect 
to see that higher premiums paid are associated with more future acquisitions.  
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Other than the above three research questions, we are also interested in the post-merger 
performance of national-pride acquirers and non-foothold acquirers. One of the possible reasons 
for poor post-merger performance is that acquirers tend to pay too much for the target. The 
literature shows a negative relationship between the premium paid and the wealth of the bidding 
firm’s shareholders. For instance, Krishnan et al. (2007) investigate a sample of 174 US 
domestic acquisitions and find that a higher acquisition premium signals a lower two-year 
average industry-adjusted return on sales (ROS). Considering the significantly high premium 
paid by national pride acquirers and by non-foothold acquirers, we expect that the national pride 
acquirers as a whole underperform relative to the non-national-pride acquirers, and such 
underperformance is mainly attributed to non-foothold acquirers.  
In summary, we are interested in the following research questions: 1. Is the overpayment 
of national-pride bids mainly attributed to the non-foothold acquirers? 2. Does organizational 
learning theory explain the higher premium paid by non-foothold acquirers? 3. Does real option 
reasoning explain the higher premium paid by non-foothold acquirers? 
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3 SAMPLE and VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS 
3.1 Data and Sample 
Our merger sample is taken from Thompson Reuters SDC Platinum database, a database 
from Thomson Financial. Most deal and firm characteristics are also obtained from this database. 
We extract proxies for operating performance from Compustat Global database. In the SDC 
database, the following criteria are used to collect our final sample:  
1) The acquisitions are cross-border deals defined by the SDC “Cross Border Flag”. 
2) Bids originate from 20 developing countries to acquire targets in 11 developed 
countries.  
3) We use “Acquirer Ultimate Parent Nation” to identify the acquiring firm’s nation 
and use “Target Nation” to identify the target firm’s nation. 
4) Deal Status is “Completed” or “Unconditional”, which means the deal is not in 
the status of pending, unknown, tentative or withdrawn.
9
 
5) Data for the bid premiums are available. 
6) The bid premium is greater than zero, where the bid premium is defined as the 
final offer price per share divided by the target’s closing price four weeks prior to 
the bid announcement, minus 1, then multiplied by 100. 
7) The targets are public companies whereas the bidders can be public, private or 
subsidiary companies. 
                                                 
9Hope et al. (2011)’s sample consists of both completed bids (78%) and incomplete bids (22%). We believe 
that by excluding incomplete bids, we can filter the noise of unsuccessful attempts. Therefore our results are more 
robust and representative compared with Hope et al. (2011).  
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Our final sample consists of 322 cross-border acquisitions. The reason for criterion 3 is 
because we believe that “Acquirer Ultimate Parent Nation” is a more accurate measure of 
acquirers’ nationality whereas the “Target Nation” is a more accurate measure of target firms’ 
nationality. In the SDC database, “Acquirer/Target Ultimate Parent Nation” represents the nation 
of ownership, whereas “Acquirer/Target Nation” represents the nation where the acquirer/target 
is operating its business or the acquirer/target is listed. In the case of Tata Steel acquiring Corus 
from the United Kingdom, the “acquirer nation” of Tata Steel is defined as “the United Kingdom” 
because it is cross-listed on the London Stock Exchange. But the “Acquirer Ultimate Parent 
Nation” of Tata Steel, India, is a more accurate representation of the nationality of its parent 
“Tata Group”, an Indian multinational conglomerate company headquartered in India. Another 
example is Tata Motors acquiring Jaguar Cars, where the “Target Ultimate Parent Nation” of 
Jaguar is defined as the United States because Ford Motors previously acquired it. However, the 
“Target Nation”, defined as the United Kingdom, represents Jaguar’s true nation because it was 
founded and mainly operates in the United Kingdom. 
 There are two justifications for criterion 6. First of all, this restriction is widely used in 
past studies (Hope et al., 2011; Rossi & Volpin, 2004). Secondly, according to Officer (2003), 
SDC platinum database tends to report premiums below zero (an economically meaningful 
bound) and this criterion makes sure that the premium variable is within a logical range.  
Following Hope et al. (2011), we adopt the United Nations Statistics classification to 
differentiate bidders and targets from “developed” or “developing” countries.10 There could be 
conflicting opinions around the classification between “developed countries” and “developing 
                                                 
10  Source: https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm#developed. According to the United 
Nations Statistics classification, developed regions include North America, Europe, Japan, New Zealand and 
Australia. All other regions and countries are classified as developing regions.  
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countries”, especially when the development status of some countries changes overtime (in most 
cases, a developing country evolves into a developed country). We respond to these concerns 
later by retesting our research questions by adopting a different country classification.  
We follow Hope et al. (2011) to restrict our sample to acquisitions originating from 
developing countries to acquire assets in developed countries because we expect this situation 
represents greater achievement and is more likely to evoke stronger national pride. Ellemers et al. 
(2002) emphasize that the impact of social identity on the way people see themselves and others 
around them should not be isolated from the social context. Some of the social context features 
such as stability have an impact on the way people perceive social identify. For instance, when 
group status is unstable, people are more inclined to identify themselves as group members. 
Since emerging markets are generally perceived as being more unstable as they are undergoing 
economic, social, political and transitional changes, we expect people from developing countries 
to have a stronger inclination to identify with their own country groups. Furthermore, Pinkus 
(2005) proposes that individuals in highly developed countries tend to be less attached to their 
nations. Also, in the history of cross-border M&A, developing-country firms are usually the 
targets of developed-country firms. Therefore, developing-country firms are more likely to see 
an acquisition of a developed-country firm as a milestone signaling the rise of their countries’ 
economy. The acquisition of a developed-country firm by a developing-country firm is more 
likely to evoke national pride because such acquisition signals a turnaround of the history.  
3.2 Variables Descriptions 
3.2.1 Construction of National Pride 
 We construct a national pride dummy for each acquisition based on a manual media 
search methodology, and we follow the national pride definition brought forward by Hope et al. 
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(2011). According to Hope et al. (2011), national pride is defined as “an indication that national, 
social, or political considerations could influence decision-making of individual decision-makers 
(business owners or managers), either rationally or irrationally.” Since it is not possible to 
observe CEOs’ sense of national pride directly, we use media searches to identify the national 
pride sentiment captured by the media. We expect that the “national, social or political 
considerations” captured by the media could manifest themselves by influencing managers’ 
individual decision making in the acquisition process.      
We use manual media searches to identify the nationalistic considerations involved in the 
acquisitions. Specifically, we use Factiva database, a search engine that provides access to more 
than 28,500 sources (including newspapers, journals, magazines, television and radio transcripts, 
photos, etc.) from 200 countries in 25 languages, including more than 600 continuously updated 
newswires from 1985 to present. Another reason to use Factiva is that Factiva has been described 
by scholars as the best approximation of public news for general investors (Bhattacharya, Galpin, 
Ray, & Yu, 2009). To make sure that our national pride measure has the same implication as 
Hope et al. (2011), we follow their three-step approach to construct national pride. The details 
about the three-step approach, as well as an example of media excerpts demonstrating national 
pride, are described in Appendix A. 
The national pride characteristic in our paper is essentially a characteristic that is unique 
for every acquisition. We do not use a national pride index or score for specific countries which 
are widely available from the sociology literature because those national pride indices are usually 
stable for certain countries over a period of time. However, our media evidence suggests that 
national pride sentiment is not involved with every acquisition because most acquisitions of 
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foreign firms are based on CEOs’ economic and rational motives. Therefore, we use deal-
specific measure of national pride instead of using the country-specific measure of national pride.  
 
3.2.2 Construction of Foothold and Non-Foothold Characteristics 
To capture the difference in embedded option values and experience, we divide national 
pride acquirers into two groups, the non-foothold group and the foothold group. If the acquirer 
has completed at least one acquisition in the same target country prior to the given national-
pride-driven acquisition, the “foothold” dummy equals one, otherwise zero for all the remaining 
observations. However, if the acquirer has not completed any acquisition in that target country 
prior to the given national-pride-driven acquisition, then the “non-foothold” dummy equals one, 
otherwise zero for all the remaining observations. From the organizational learning perspective, 
the foothold acquirers represent acquiring firms with prior acquisition experience, while non-
foothold acquirers represent inexperienced acquiring firms. Each national pride acquisition is 
assigned a foothold dummy as well as a non-foothold dummy. For acquisitions not involved with 
national pride, we assign zero for both dummies. Our measure of “foothold” or “non-foothold” 
dummy uniquely captures the difference of past acquisition experience that is specific to certain 
target country.   
 
3.2.3 Dependent Variables 
  For our research questions, we choose natural logarithm of acquisition premiums, 
calculated as the percentage that final offer price is higher than the target’s closing price four 
weeks prior to acquisition announcement, as our main dependent variable. Acquisition premium 
is a proxy for how much higher an acquiring firm is willing to pay over a target firm’s fair 
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market value. Our measure of acquisition premium is commonly used in the M&A literature 
(Rossi & Volpin, 2004; Hope et al. 2011), and is calculated following Formula 1 below. We 
believe that the stock price four weeks prior to the acquisition announcement represents target 
firms’ fair market value. It is neither too close to the acquisition announcement date so that the 
chance of acquisition information leakage is relatively small, nor too far away from the 
announcement date so that the stock price reflects more recent market information. In our 
robustness tests, we also use premiums calculated using target firms’ closing price one week 
prior to acquisition announcement. A list of all variables and their descriptions is also shown in 
Appendix B. 
Premium  
final offer price per share
target closing stock price   weeks prior to announcement
 1  100                 
(1) 
           
For additional tests regarding post-merger performance, we choose ROA of the acquirer 
as a proxy for acquirers’ long-term post-acquisition performance. We set the year of acquisition 
completion as the acquisition year and calculate the ROA of the acquirer for each year in the 3-
year period after the acquisition year. Following Healy et al. (1992) and Cornett et al. (2007), we 
calculate ROA as operating cash flow (i.e. annual earnings before interest and tax plus 
depreciation and goodwill) divided by total assets. This definition accounts for different tax 
policies in different countries and the difference in the method of payments, and is consistent 
with Healy et al. (1992) and Yen and Andre (2007). Furthermore, this measure is comparable 
across firms with different financial leverage. The median of the ROA in the 3-year post-
acquisition period is chosen as a proxy for post-merger operating performance. Using the same 
method, the median of the acquirer’s ROA in the 3-year period prior to the acquisition is chosen 
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as a proxy for pre-acquisition performance of the acquirer (      ). Equation 2 shows the 
details of the calculation. 
   t 
Salest COGSt SG At Depreciationt Goodwillt
Total Assett
 
EBITDAt
Total Assett
 
      (2) 
where t=1, 2 or 3, representing the first, the second, and the third year after the 
acquisition completion year (t=0).  
 
3.2.4 Control Variables 
For the research question regarding bid premiums (research question 1 to 3), we control 
for the firm level, the deal level and the country level variables. For the firm level, we control for 
target size and targets’ profit generating ability. For the deal level control variables, we use the 
existence of competing bids, the existence of tender offer, an acquirer being a financial buyer, 
the attitude of the bidder and the cash bid dummy (method of payment). The existence of 
competing bidders tends to drive up acquisition premiums due to competition (Hayward and 
Hambrick, 2002). Similarly, the existence of tender offer has the same effect of driving up 
acquisition premiums. An acquiring firm being a financial buyer usually indicates minority 
interests as well as a lower acquisition premium compensating for lack of control. If the attitude 
of the acquisition is hostile, we expect to see a higher premium due to resistance from the target 
firm. Method of payment (CashBid) may also affect the acquisition premium. There are three 
types of payment, cash, stock, or a combination of both. The means of payment hypothesis 
suggests that higher premium is associated with stock payment. However, empirical studies fail 
to support this hypothesis. According to Rau & Vermaelen (1998), in general, bidders do not pay 
higher premiums in stock-financed acquisitions. However, overvalued acquiring firms, 
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characterized by low book-to-market ratio, pay a higher premium in 100% stock-financed 
acquisitions. Similarly, Hayward and Hambrick (1997) fails to find a significant effect of stock 
payment on acquisition premiums in general.  
The firm level controls are related to acquiring firms’ or target firms’ characteristics in 
terms of size and profit generating capability. Rossi and Volpin (2004) find a significantly 
negative association between target size and bid premiums in their sample of worldwide 
acquisitions. Following Hope et al. (2011), we also control target firms’ ability to generate 
profits (TargetProfit). We expect acquiring firms to pay a higher premium for a target with 
higher profitability.  
At the country level, we control for target country’s shareholder protection level and the 
cultural distance between the acquiring country and the target country. As in La Porta et al. 
(1998), target countries’ shareholder protection level is calculated as Anti-director rights 
multiplied by Rule of law divided by 10.
11
 Past studies find that acquiring firms are willing to 
pay more for a target in a country with a higher level of shareholder protection (Rossi & Volpin, 
2004; Hope et al. 2011). The cultural distance between the acquiring country and the target 
country is calculated based on Hofstede’s four primary dimensions: power distance, 
individualism, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance (see formula 3 below, where 1 indicates 
the acquirer country and 2 indicates the target country; PID denotes for Power Distance; IDV 
denotes for Individualism; MAS denotes for Masculinity; UAI denotes for Uncertainty 
                                                 
11 In La Porta et al. (1998), Rule of law is an assessment of the law and order tradition developed by 
International Country Risk (ICR), scaling from 0 to 10, with lower scores indicating less tradition for law and order. 
Anti-director rights measure is an index aggregating the six “anti-director rights”, scaling from 0 to 6, with 0 
denoting no anti-director rights.  
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Avoidance).
12
 The expected effect of cultural distance on acquisition premiums is unclear. 
Acquiring firms may prefer to pay a lower premium for wider cultural distance because of higher 
integration cost; but target firms may require a higher premium for wider cultural distance 
because the probability of successful integration is lower. In the literature related to cross-border 
acquisitions, Dikova and Sahib (2013) show that the relation between cross-border acquisition 
experience and post-acquisition performance becomes stronger as cultural distance increases 
whereas domestic acquisition experience has no effect on the performance of a cross-border 
acquisition. Their results are in line with the studies that emphasize the importance of dealing 
with cultural differences in cross-border acquisitions. The prior cross-border acquisition 
experience provides cross-border bidders a chance to gain a sense of cultural differences or 
conflicts, which help them overcome cultural distance and achieve superior long-term M&A 
performance (Chakrabarti, Gupta-Mukherjee, & Jayaraman, 2009). Hence, our control for 
cultural distance is an important one in our tests of post-acquisition performance. 
Cultural Distance1,2  
 PDI1 PDI2 2  ID 1 ID 2 2  MAS1 MAS2 2  UAI1 UAI2 2
 
 
             (3) 
For tests of operating performance, we first control for the pre-acquisition ROA on the 
ground that pre-acquisition performance strongly signals post-acquisition performance. We also 
control several deal characteristics, including competing bid, and 100% acquisition (or Full 
Acquisition). We further control the industry relatedness between the acquiring firm and the 
                                                 
12 According to Prof. Hofstede’s website, Power distance is defined as the extent to which the less powerful 
members of institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally; 
Individualism is the degree of interdependence a society maintains among its member;. Masculinity is what 
motivates people, wanting to be the best (masculine) or liking what you do (feminine); Uncertainty avoidance is the 
extent to which the members of a culture feel threatened by ambiguous or unknown situations and have created 
beliefs and institutions that try to avoid these.  
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target firm, the shareholder protection level of the target country, and the cultural distance 
between the acquiring country and the target country.  
3.2.5 Summary Statistics and Pearson Pairwise Correlation 
Table 1 presents the distribution of the 322 bids in terms of acquiring country and target 
country. From Table 1, we observe clustering of bids targeted at certain countries. The United 
States, Australia, Hong Kong and the United Kingdom tend to be the targets among developed 
countries while Singapore, China, South Africa and Malaysia complete relatively more 
acquisitions of developed-country targets.  
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
Among the 322 acquisitions, we identify 36 national-pride-driven acquisitions.
13
 The 
distribution of the 36 national pride bids is displayed in Table 2, Panel A. From the distribution, 
we find that India, Mexico, Singapore and South Africa tend to have more national pride bids 
compared with other developing countries. Among the 36 national pride bids, 20 of the acquirers 
are identified as “foothold” acquirers while 16 of the acquirers are identified as “non-foothold” 
acquirers. The distribution of the 20 acquisitions with a foothold position is shown in Table 2, 
Panel B. A relatively strong country-wise foothold pattern is observed in the South Africa-
Australia pair and the Singapore-United States pair.  
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
                                                 
13 A list of the national pride bids and the media excerpts that support their national pride identity could be 
provided on request. 
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The time series distribution of the full sample in terms of the number of bids is exhibited 
in Table 3. From the patterns, we find an upward trend along with time, as well as a peak in the 
late 2000’s.  
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
The summary statistics for the whole sample is displayed in Table 4. Panel A presents 
summary statistics for the full sample including both the national pride and non-national pride 
bids. In the full sample, approximately 2% of the bids have at least one competing offer from 
other bidders; 36% are involved in a tender offer; 11% are initiated by a financial buyer; 2% of 
the bids are defined as hostile; and 61% are paid with 100% cash. Panel B shows the summary 
statistics for the 36 national pride bids. This subsample demonstrates similar patterns as the full 
sample. However, it contains a higher percentage of bids associated with competing bids (14%) 
and tender offers (58%). Descriptive statistics for the foothold acquisitions are exhibited in Panel 
C. Again, compared with national pride bids, the bid characteristics are similar. Un-tabulated 
statistics show that the average premium based on a four-week window is 39.89%. This figure is 
close to that of a similar study by Rossi and Volpin (2004), where they find an average premium 
of 41.6% for 4007 worldwide acquisitions between 1990 and 1999. 
[Insert   
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Table 4 Here] 
The Pearson correlations are illustrated in Table 5. Panel A presents the correlations for 
our full sample of 322 bids. Both measures of premium are significantly and positively 
correlated with the national pride measure (at the 0.05 level).  
  [Insert Table 5 Here] 
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4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1 Effect of national pride on acquisition premiums  
This section aims at replicating the research question in Hope et al. (2011). The following 
regression model is estimated:  
Log (Premium) = a+ b(National pride dummy) + c(Control variables)+e       (4) 
We regress the log of the bid premium measured with a four-week window on the 
national pride dummy variable. We control for three levels of control variables identified by 
previous research, country level, firm level and deal level controls.  
Our regression results for acquisition premiums and national pride characteristics are 
exhibited in Table 6.
14, 15
 All regression results presented in the tables are based on Huber-White 
standard errors unless otherwise stated.
16
 Industry controls are based on Fama-French 12-
industry classification, which is widely used in the finance literature for industry classifications 
(e.g. Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Denis et al., 2003). In model 1, we find that the natural 
logarithm of acquisition premium (based on a four-week window) is higher in the national pride 
acquisitions. We continue to find similar results after adding the cultural distance between the 
acquiring country and target country in model 2. In all models, the coefficient for national pride 
                                                 
14 The multicollinearity is not a concern in any of the results shown in the paper. Specifically, the highest 
variance inflation factor (VIF) for any independent variables in all regressions is merely 3.10.  
15 We try winsorizing the top 1% of the premium measures and the bottom 3% of the targets’ profit margin 
measures in all the tests. No inferences are affected except that the coefficient for profit margin changes from 
insignificant to significant in a few models. 
16 Although we cannot completely rule out the possibility of endogeneity, we do not find significant issues 
of endogeneity. Plus, Hope et al. (2011) have already tested some of the possible omitted variables, including 
political connections, national pride index, the novelty of M A occurrence, target firms’ glamour, and ownership 
characteristics, and their results remain. Since our study is an extension of Hope et al. (2011), we do not feel the 
need to repeat tests of those omitted variables already addressed by Hope et al. (2011). Another cause for 
endogeneity is the possibility of reverse causality that high premium could cause media hype. We do not think of 
this as a major concern in this paper because we found that media are usually attracted by large-size deals, but they 
are seldom attracted by high bid premium alone.  
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dummy is positive and significant at the 0.05 level. More specifically, the coefficients for 
national pride dummy in columns 1 and 2 are 0.409 and 0.384, respectively. All else being equal, 
these findings also demonstrate economic significance: premiums paid for national pride bids are 
approximately 47% higher than those of non-national-pride bids.
17
 Consistent with our 
expectation and that of Hope et al. (2011), we find that the existence of national pride in a cross-
border acquisition is an indicator for higher acquisition premiums. In other words, the national 
pride sentiment captured by the media is positively associated with the acquisition premium.   
  [Insert Table 6 Here] 
The results show a positive effect of competing bid on bid premiums. This finding is 
consistent with that in both Rossi and Volpin (2004) and Hope et al. (2011). For the country 
level control variables, a positive association between the shareholder protection level and the 
acquisition premium is observed. Thus, acquirers are willing to pay more for a target firm if the 
target operates in a country with higher level of shareholder protection. This is consistent with 
“bonding hypothesis” proposed in the cross-listing literature (Coffee, 1999). However, we fail to 
find a significant effect of cultural distance on bid premiums. This is also consistent with Hope et 
al. (2011). 
 We also replicate our results using bid premiums estimated based on a seven-day 
window. The regression results are displayed in column 3 to 4 in Table 6. The sign and 
significance of national pride coefficient are similar to those in regressions with the four-week-
window premium (LogPremium-4w). 
                                                 
17 Note that the dependent variable in our tests is the natural logarithm of the bid premium. Therefore a 
coefficient of 0.384 should be translated into a 47% higher premium.  
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In our tests thus far, we classify countries as developed or developing using the United 
Nations classification consistent with Hope et al. (2011). This classification is based on regions 
instead of specific countries and is slightly different from that of the International Monitory Fund. 
To address this issue, we replicate our results using country classifications brought forward by 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the April 2013 Word Economic Outlook report. 
According to this report, 33 nations are classified as “advanced economies”. We retest this 
research question by using the sub-sample that complies with the IMF criteria.
18,19
 Un-tabulated 
results show that the coefficient of national pride dummy continues to be positive and significant.   
4.2 Research question 1: Is the overpayment of national-pride bids mainly attributed to 
the non-foothold acquirers?  
To address our research question of whether the non-foothold (or foothold) characteristic 
is associated with higher (or lower) bid premiums in national-pride-driven acquisitions, we 
estimate the following model (Equation 5) using the full sample of acquisitions involving 
developing country bidders and developed country targets. This model compares the foothold 
and non-foothold acquirers with those represented in non-national-pride-driven sub-sample.
20, 21
  
Log(Premium) = a+ b(Foothold acquirer) + c(Non-foothold acquirer)+ d(Control variables)+e                                             
(5) 
                                                 
18  These 33 advanced economies are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, South Korea, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, NZ, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Taiwan, UK, and US.  
19 The IMF criteria require removing the observations with South Korea or Singapore as the acquiring 
nation from the sample.  
20 There is no dummy variable trap in this model because our base group is the non-national-pride-driven 
acquirers that do not belong either to the foothold or non-foothold category. 
21 An ideal way to test the effect of foothold and non-foothold characteristics in this research question is to 
test “Log(Premium) = a+ b(Foothold Dummy) + d(Control Variables)+e” among the sample of 36 national pride 
bids. However, due to small sample size, we do not have enough observations/heterogeneity to conduct this. 
Therefore, we choose to test equation 5 using the full sample, which is essentially to compare the foothold acquirers 
and the non-foothold acquirers with the base group (acquirers in the non-national-pride acquisitions).         
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We first test the natural logarithm of premiums (using a four-week window) as the 
dependent variable. The foothold acquirer dummy represents the 20 acquirers that obtain a 
foothold position in the target country prior to the national pride acquisition while the non-
foothold acquirer dummy represents the 16 acquirers that fail to obtain such a foothold position. 
Similar to the section 4.1, three levels of controls are implemented in terms of deal level, firm 
level and country level. The regression results are shown in Table 7. In Model 1, we find that 
non-foothold acquirers pay a significantly higher acquisition premium in the national-pride-
driven acquisitions whereas the foothold acquirers do not. Specifically, we document a positive 
coefficient (0.6527) in Model 1, which is significant at the 0.05 level. In addition to being 
statistically significant, the coefficient of the non-foothold characteristic also demonstrates 
substantial economic significance. All else being equal, the results suggest that the bid premium 
paid by non-foothold acquirers is approximately 1.92 times that paid by non-national-pride 
acquirers while the bid premium paid by foothold acquirers is approximately 1.21 times that paid 
by non-national-pride acquirers. In other words, the non-foothold acquirers, rather than foothold 
acquirers, overpay for the national-pride-driven acquisitions. In Model 2, we continue to find 
significant coefficient of non-foothold dummy after adding cultural difference control.           
These findings have two implications regarding the importance of obtaining a foothold 
position prior to the national-pride-driven acquisitions. Firstly, from the real options perspective, 
the overpayment by the non-foothold acquirers could be the price paid for options included in the 
first acquisition in the target country. The value of these options, including the option to expand, 
the option to have access to government contracts, the option to have access to cheaper financing, 
are substantially higher in the first acquisition in a new country compared with that in later 
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acquisitions. Secondly, from the organizational learning perspective, obtaining a foothold 
position provides acquirers a chance to learn and perfect the unique skills required to succeed in 
the target country. On the contrary, a lack of prior experience likely results in worse judgment 
regarding target selection and appropriate premiums. Put differently, the higher premium paid by 
non-foothold acquirers is either a result of lacking prior acquisition experience or paying for the 
strategic and growth options, or both.  
As for the control variables, the existence of competing bidder and the level of 
shareholder protection positively affect the acquisition premium paid by acquirers, while the size 
of target firms negatively affects the acquisition premium. The results suggest that acquirers are 
willing to pay more for a target firm if it is in a country with higher level of shareholder 
protection (e.g. the United States or Canada) or if there are some other acquirers competing for 
the same target firm. These findings corroborate previous results in cross-border M&A studies 
(Rossi and Volpin 2004, Hope et al. 2011). Although the domestic M&A literature shows mixed 
results regarding the effect of target size (Laamanen, 2007), the cross-border M&A literature 
consistently shows a negative effect of target size on premiums (Rossi and Volpin 2004, Hope et 
al. 2011).  
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
For robustness, first we use the bid premium estimated in a one-week window. The 
regression results are shown in column 3 to 4 in Table 7. The sign and significance of 
coefficients are comparable to those coefficients in regressions of the four-week-window 
premium. The coefficient for the non-foothold dummy remains positive and significant, whereas 
the coefficient for the foothold dummy remains insignificant. Therefore, our inferences are not 
affected even when an alternative measure of acquisition premium is used.   
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The second robustness is to address the concerns regarding the country classification 
between developed and developing countries. Similar to research question 1, we adopt the 
classification by IMF and retest using the subsample that complies with this new criterion. Our 
regression results in Table 8 shows that our inferences remain.  
  [Insert Table 8 Here] 
4.3 Research question 2: Does organizational learning theory explain the higher 
premium paid by non-foothold acquirers? 
If organizational learning theory explains the higher (lower) premium paid by non-
foothold acquirers, we expect that national pride acquirers with more acquisition experience will 
pay a lower premium. Here we use two continuous measures of acquirers’ prior acquisition 
experience. The first measure is the number of acquisitions completed in the same target country 
prior to the national-pride-driven acquisitions. The second measure is the number of years 
between the first acquisition in the same target country and the national-pride-driven acquisition. 
We are interested in testing whether more acquisition experience, in terms of time length (i.e. 
number of years) or in terms of records (i.e. number of acquisitions), signals a lower future 
premium as predicted by organizational learning theory. Un-tabulated results show that, for the 
foothold acquirers, the average number of prior acquisitions is 4.1 while the average number of 
years since the first acquisition is 4.85. We regress the natural logarithm of premium on the 
acquisition experience and other control variables as in equation 6.  
Log(Premium) = a+ b(Acquisition experience) + c(Control variables)+e      (6) 
Our regression results in Table 9 show a negative and significant coefficient for the 
number of past acquisitions in Model 1, suggesting that each additional acquisition completed in 
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the past is associated with 2.8% lower premium paid in national-pride-driven acquisitions. 
However, in Model 2, the acquisition experience measured in time length does not have such a 
significant influence on acquisition premiums of the national pride acquisitions. This suggests 
that the experience accumulated through more acquisitions may equip bidders with the skills 
needed to negotiate a lower acquisition price in national-pride-driven acquisitions. However, the 
time length does not show such a significant effect. Model 3 shows the combined effect of these 
two experience measures. As the table shows, the coefficient of the number of acquisitions 
remains significant (at 0.05 level), while that of the number of years remains statistically 
insignificant. These results suggest that inexperienced acquirers, namely the non-foothold 
acquirers, tend to pay higher premiums in the national-pride-driven acquisitions as a result of 
lacking prior country-specific acquisition experience. Therefore, it supports organizational 
learning theory in explaining the higher premium paid in the non-foothold acquisitions. On the 
other hand, a longer time length in the target country may not necessarily suggest superior 
experience, but sometimes could imply dormant participation as the acquisition opportunities 
may have been depleted. This is consistent with the findings in Hayward (2002) that an inverted 
U-shape relationship exists between the post-merger performance and the time elapsed between 
the focal acquisition and the last acquisition.   
  [Insert Table 9 Here] 
4.4 Research question 3: Does real options reasoning explain the higher (lower) premium 
paid by non-foothold (foothold) acquirers?  
Although our results for question 1 show that non-foothold acquirers pay higher premiums, 
it is unclear whether the national-pride acquirers are actually paying more for the real options to 
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expand. If so, we expect that acquirers that pay a higher premium will have more future 
acquisitions completed in that same country or in that geographical area. A higher involvement 
in future acquisitions is an indication that these high-premium-paying acquirers are actually 
executing the long-term strategic expansion plan that they have paid a high price for. We, first, 
divide national pride acquirers into two groups, the high-premium group and the low-premium 
group. Then, we measure the number of future acquisitions completed and the value of 
acquisitions in million dollars in both the target country and all developed countries during the 
six-year period following the acquisition completion year. The mean and the univariate test 
results are presented in Table 10. 
  [Insert Table 10 Here] 
The results show that the high-premium-paying group has substantially higher level of 
future acquisitions, in term of the number of acquisitions and the transaction value, in the six-
year period following the national pride acquisitions than the low-premium-paying group. For 
instance, the high-premium-paying group completed, on average, eight acquisitions after the 
national pride acquisition while the low-premium-paying group completed only three 
acquisitions of the targets from all developed countries. Further univariate tests confirm the 
statistical difference in terms of transaction value in the same target country and in terms of the 
number of acquisitions in all developed countries.
22
 These results provide some evidence that 
high-premium-paying acquirers are actually executing their long-term strategic plan to expand in 
                                                 
22  The difference in terms of the number of acquisitions in the same target country and in terms of 
transaction value in all developed countries is not statistically significant, possibly because of the low statistical 
power of the test. However, it seems economically significant that the high-premium group completed 
approximately three times future acquisitions compared with the low-premium group in those two measures. 
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a new geographical area, for which they have paid a substantial price, supporting real options 
explanation.   
4.5 Additional test of operating performance: Do national pride acquirers 
underperform? 
To test the post-merger performance of national pride acquirers, we estimate the 
following model in the full sample.  
   post     National pride  ummy   (Control variables)         (8) 
We use the median ROA in the 3-year period following the acquisition completion year 
as a proxy for acquirers’ post-merger performance. We regress post-acquisition performance on 
the national pride dummy and a variety of control variables.  
The regression results are reported in Table 11 below. The adjusted    is between 39% 
and 54%. Looking at our key independent variable, national pride, we find that the coefficient of 
national pride is negative and significant in all models. This is consistent with Krishnan et al. 
(2007)’s finding that there is a negative association between premiums paid and post-acquisition 
operating performance, and one reason behind the underperformance is severe workforce 
reduction after paying a high premium. The coefficient for national pride is not only statistically 
significant but also economically meaningful. For instance, the coefficient in Model 2 is -0.0310, 
implying that the ROA of national pride acquirers is 3.1 percentage points lower than that of 
acquirers not involved in national pride acquisitions. This also represents economic significance 
since the average post-merger ROA of the whole sample is merely 10.64 percentage points. As 
for the control variables, pre-acquisition performance and the shareholder protection level of the 
target country have positive and significant effects on post-acquisition performance. The strong 
signaling effect of pre-acquisition performance supports our expectation, and corroborates the 
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findings in Yen and Andre (2007) and Krishnan et al. (2007). Higher level of shareholder 
protection in a target country also signals superior post-merger performance.  
For robustness, we follow the country classification by the IMF and report regression 
results for the restricted sample in column 3 and 4. The coefficient of national pride remains 
negative and significant. Among the control variables, the effects of shareholder protection and 
pre-acquisition performance remain significant.  
  [Insert Table 11 Here] 
4.6 Additional test of operating performance: Is the underperformance of national pride 
acquirers mainly attributable to non-foothold acquirers? 
Before formally testing the operating performance of non-foothold acquirers, we first 
look into the anecdotal evidence of the impact of foothold/non-foothold characteristics on post-
merger performance of national pride acquirers.  
When investigating foothold acquirers, we found two notable examples. The first 
example is the expansion of Cemex, a Mexican cement producer, in the United States. Instead of 
immediately acquiring industry leaders, Cemex started its expansion through smaller acquisitions 
of two subsidiaries of its competitor Lafarge in 1994, six years before its high-profile acquisition 
of Southdown in 2000. Before the acquisition of Southdown, Cemex was a relatively small 
player in the United States with insignificant market share.
23
 But after this acquisition, Cemex 
became the largest cement company in North America with 15% market share in 2004.
24
 
Another similar example is the expansion of Cia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD thereafter) from 
                                                 
23Source: Kevin K. Boeh, Paul W. Beamish. “Mergers and Acquisitions: Text and Cases”. Page 230.  
24  Source: Mike Betts and Robert Crimes, “Construction and Building Materials Sector,” JP Morgan 
European Equity Research, August 16, 2004; CEMEX. 
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Brazil into the Canadian market. CVRD used its acquisition of a small Canadian nickel mining 
company Canico Resources to pave its way towards the $18.9 billion acquisition of Inco, the 
world's second largest nickel-miner, in 2006. This mega-deal acquisition turned CVRD into the 
largest nickel producer and the second-largest miner, and the strong performance of Inco was the 
main source for C DR’s significant profit increase in 2007.25,26 
We also provide two anecdotal examples to suggest that failure to obtain some footing 
position before pursuing industry leaders could have a negative impact on post-merger 
performance. One example is the acquisition of Corus in the UK by Tata Steel of India in 2008, 
which is marked as the first acquisition of Tata Steel in the United Kingdom. Although this $8.1 
billion acquisition has made Tata Steel the fifth largest steel firm in the world, it has also caused 
Tata Steel to struggle with the restructuring costs from 1700 job cuts of Corus in 2009.
27,28
 Also, 
Corus’s reported annual loss of 75.04 billion Rupees was the main contributor for Tata Steel’s 
downgrade from Moody and its loss of 20.09 billion Rupees in fiscal year 2010.
29, 30
 Another 
similar example is Hindalco (India)’s expansion into the United States. Its acquisition of Novelis, 
the world's largest producer of rolled aluminum and a major recycler of aluminum cans, in 2007, 
is marked as its first acquisition in the United States. However, two years after the $6 billion 
payment for the acquisition, Novelis’s $1.8 billion huge loss erode the net worth of the parent 
company Hindalco and stopped it from making further acquisitions worldwide.
31
  
                                                 
25 Source: BBC News, 24 October 2006, “Brazilian miner buys Canada rival”. 
26 Source: Reuters, May 3, 2007, “Brazil miner C RD Q1 profit soars on nickel”. 
27 Source: BBC news, 20 October 2006, “Corus accepts £ .3bn Tata offer”. 
28 Source: BBC news, 4 December 2009, “Corus job cuts 'horrendous' for Teesside”. 
29 Source: Factiva. Moody's Investors Service Press Release, 4 March 2009, “Moody's downgrades Tata 
Steel; continues review for possible downgrade”. 
30 Source: Factiva. Daily News & Analysis. 19 July 2010, “Tata Steel arms script a terrific turnaround”. 
31 Source: The Indian Express, Feb 19 2009, “Novelis losses to eat into Hindalco networth”. 
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          The above examples provide anecdotal evidence that failing to obtain a foothold position 
prior to national pride bids might result in worse performance. Therefore, the underperformance 
of national pride acquirers is likely caused by acquirers that fail to obtain foothold positions. We 
estimate the following model in the full sample. 
    post    (Foothold acquirer dummy)  (Non  oothold acquirer dummy) 
  (Control variables)               (9) 
Similar to the test of national pride acquirers, we use the median ROA in the 3-year 
period following the acquisition completion as a proxy for acquirers’ post-merger performance. 
If the under-performance of national pride acquirers is mainly attributable to the non-foothold 
acquirers, we expect coefficient   to be negative and significant and coefficient   to be 
insignificant.  
The regression results are shown in Table 12. Model 1 and 2 present the results for the 
whole sample. In all models, we find that the non-foothold acquirers perform significantly worse 
than the base group. Non-foothold acquirers are associated with lower ROA in the 3-year period 
following the completion of acquisition. A negative coefficient (-0.0392) for the non-foothold 
dummy in Model 2 is documented, which is significant at the 0.10 level. In addition to being 
statistically significant, non-foothold dummy is also economically significant. All else being 
equal, the post-merge ROA for the non-foothold acquirers is 3.92% lower than that of acquirers 
not involved in national pride acquisitions. Conversely, the coefficient for foothold acquirers is 
negative yet insignificant, suggesting that the underperformance of national pride acquirers is 
mainly attributed to the underperformance of non-foothold acquirers. These findings are in line 
with our expectations and support organizational learning theory in explaining the 
underperformance of national pride acquirers that lacking acquisition experience could have an 
adverse impact on post-merger performance. The results also suggest the importance of 
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acquiring a relatively small firm prior to acquiring industry leaders. Among the control variables, 
we find that post-merger ROA is positively associated with pre-acquisition ROA and target 
countries’ shareholder protection level. Therefore, a target country with better shareholder 
protection provides better business environment and offers better chance for post-merger 
operating success. The adjusted R
2
 across all models are between 39% and 48%, representing 
high degree of explanatory power of regression models. These findings are consistent with the 
findings in Yen and Andre (2007). We fail to find significant effect of competing bid 
documented by Yen and Andre (2007) but the negative sign of competing bid is consistent.   
[Insert Table 12 Here] 
Model 3 and 4 show the regression results under the IMF country classification. We find 
similar results compared to Model 1 and Model 2. The coefficient of non-foothold acquirers 
remains negative and significant while the coefficient of the foothold acquirers remains 
insignificant. As for the control variables, we observe similar patterns among the coefficients.    
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5 CONCLUSION 
Consistent with the findings in Hope et al. (2011), we find that developing-country acquirers pay 
a higher premium in deals that can be classified as national-pride acquisitions, compared to those 
classified as non-national-pride acquisitions. However, it is unclear whether the national pride is 
the true motive behind such an acquisition or not. It is possible that the displayed national pride 
is merely an overly excited reaction from the public towards a nationalistic event, whereas 
managers are rational decision makers. In this study, we argue that there are other plausible 
explanations for the high premium paid by national pride acquirers, including payment for a 
long-term expansion strategy and payment for lack of country specific experience.  
Using a sample of acquisitions of developed-country targets by developing-country 
bidders, we find that the national pride acquirers overpay for the target firm, and the 
overpayment is mainly attributed to the bids by non-foothold acquirers. In further tests, we find 
that the bid premium is a negative function of the number of past bids made by national pride 
bidders in that country, which we interpret as evidence supporting organizational learning theory. 
We also find that national-pride-bidders that pay a higher premium have a higher level of future 
acquisition activity (in terms of the number and transaction value) in the target country and in all 
developed countries, which we interpret as evidence supporting the real options explanation. 
Therefore, the aforementioned results suggest that national pride acquirers pay higher premiums 
both for the lack of experience and for real options that could be tied to a long-term expansion 
strategy. In further tests related to post-merger performance, we find that the national pride 
acquirers underperform operationally relative to acquirers not involved in national pride 
acquisitions, and the operational underperformance is mainly attributable to the non-foothold 
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acquirers. One explanation for this finding is the lack of prior acquisition experience of non-
foothold acquirers.  
We consider the two channels, the real options channel and the organizational learning 
channel, as two sides of the coin to explain the high premium payment by national pride 
acquirers. While the organizational learning channel emphasizes the impact of past acquisition 
experience, the real options channel highlights the influence of forward-looking viewpoint 
regarding the future market’s potential and uncertainty. Therefore, we consider these two 
channels as complementary and inseparable to each other. 
These results may imply that foothold acquirers represent the type of acquirers with 
cautious market entry strategy, which starts with acquisitions of smaller firms before pursuing 
dominant firms or industry giants, namely, the typical targets in the national pride acquisitions. 
On the contrary, non-foothold acquirers represent the type of aggressive acquirers that tend to 
adopt aggressive market entry strategy starting with acquisitions of industry leaders. They aim at 
acquiring industry leaders even before gaining a foothold position in a new market. However, 
our results show that such a radical market entry strategy is associated with overpayment and 
underperformance. In summary, our results suggest a superior market entry pattern, which is to 
start with gaining a foothold position in a new market by acquiring firms with relatively small 
size, before acquiring industry leaders.  
We contribute to the literature by emphasizing the significance of gaining a foothold 
position in cross-border mergers and acquisition. We also provide empirical support for both 
organizational learning theory and real options reasoning in explaining the higher premium paid 
by the national pride acquirers. This is also the first study that investigates the post-acquisition 
operating performance of the national pride acquirers.  
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Our results are robust to the inclusion of a variety of controls, different measures of 
premium and use of different country development measures; yet, we acknowledge that there are 
some limitations that remain unaddressed fully. One of the limitations of this paper is the 
classification of developed and developing countries. First, development status may change 
during our sample period from 1990 to 2008. Second, there is no consensus regarding the 
classification of developing and developed countries. Therefore, we adopt two classifications 
from the United Nations and the IMF to ensure our inferences are robust to different 
classifications.  
Another limitation of the paper is that there could be bias when using media search 
approach to construct national pride variable. The interpretation of national pride indication 
could be subjective in nature. Also, it is possible that some of the media hype could be aroused 
by the high-profile characteristic of the acquisition. The excitement presented in the media could 
be merely ex-post market reaction to these mega-deals, whereas managers are not under the 
influence of national pride. Therefore, to alleviate these weaknesses inherent in the media search 
methodology, future researchers interested in the impact of national pride can consider using a 
more direct measure of national pride through interviews or surveys with the decision makers.   
With globalization and integration of global economies, it is likely that firms increasingly 
rely on cross-border acquisitions as a major mode of entry to a new country. Although national 
pride likely plays a role in the process of cross-border acquisitions, our preliminary analysis 
suggests that an indirect measure of national pride, through media search, could be inaccurate 
sometimes. Therefore, using a direct measure of national pride, through survey or interview 
methodology, could be a direction for future researchers interested in topics related to the role of 
national pride in cross-border M&A.   
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Appendix A Three-step approach of national pride construction and media excerpt example 
In step 1, we search by the following criteria for each deal on Factiva database: 
a. Search “target name AND bidder name” in the whole article. In order to achieve the 
greatest coverage, we delete the suffix such as Inc. 
b. Restrict date range to -3 months and +3 months around the acquisition announcement 
date. We restrict time period to one quarter surrounding the acquisition announcement so that the 
media articles most likely capture information about the given acquisition.  
c. Choose “all sources”, “all companies”, “all subjects”, “all industries”, and “all regions”. 
Again, we do not exclude specific source so as not to miss important media articles.   
d. Restrict to English language. As national pride is more likely to emerge in acquirer 
country’s media, the ideal way is to translate local media articles into English. However, due to 
cost and resource constraint, we decide to limit to English language.   
e. Exclude republished news, recurring market and price data, sports news, obituaries, etc.  
In step 2, we conduct a headline search for indication of national pride for each Factiva 
output from the first step. Specifically, we scan the headline and leading sentences and look for 
direct or indirect mention of patriotism, national sentiment in the completion of the deal, social 
impact, political interference/influence beyond the obvious business of the firms, excessive 
excitement about the bid, or excessive anticipation. Articles found to contain potential “national 
pride” indication are selected for detailed reading of the whole article to confirm its “national 
pride” characteristics.  
The last step involves the identification of national pride for each acquisition. If we find 
at least one article that contains indication of “national pride” (as defined above), we code that 
acquisition a “national pride acquisition”. Eventually, we identify 36 acquisitions out of 322 as 
“national pride acquisitions”. A complete list of national pride bids and the corresponding media 
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excerpts can be obtained from the author upon request. To illustrate how national pride is 
captured through media, we provide an example of media excerpts that surround the acquisition 
of Southdown in the US by Cemex from Mexico in 2000.  
National pride acquisition: The acquisition of Southdown (US) by Cemex (Mexico) in 
2000 
Publication: Latin Finance, December 1
st
 2000 
Excerpts alluding to national pride:  
Mexico's cement giant crosses the border to grab a prize US acquisition, boosting its cash 
flow and diversifying into a developed market. … For years, US and European 
multinationals have gobbled up Latin American companies in their quest for high-growth 
markets. Now, the direction has shifted. In November, Mexico's Cemex, the world's 
third-largest cement maker, bought Houston-based Southdown, the second-largest US 
cement producer. After launching a tender offer of $73 per share, Cemex acquired 91.7% 
of Southdown for more than $2.  billion. … Lorenzo Zambrano, Cemex's CEO, said in 
October that the company was interested in striking a "balance between our developed 
and developing-country markets."   
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Appendix B Description of variables 
Variable  Description Source 
Panel A: Deal-level variables 
NP-FootholdAcquirer An indicator variable that takes on a value of 1 if the acquirer has completed at least one 
acquisition in the same target country
32
 prior to the national pride acquisition; otherwise, it 
takes on a value of 0 for all other observations in the sample.  
SDC platinum 
Author’s 
computation 
NP-NonFootholdAcquirer  An indicator variable that takes on a value of 1 if the acquirer has not completed any 
acquisition in the same target country
33
 prior to the national pride acquisition; otherwise, it 
takes on a value of 0 for all other observations in the sample.  
SDC platinum 
Author’s 
computation 
National Pride Following Hope et al. (2011), it's an indicator variable that equals 1 if the media coverage 
surrounding the transaction contains references to national pride or hubris or political 
considerations in the context of the transaction, 0 otherwise. Media articles are examined on 
the Factiva database using the target name and the bidder name in the search string during the 
time period three months prior to the date of announcement to three months after. 
 
 
Author's manual 
search on Factiva 
LogPremium-4w Natural logarithm of premium calculated based on a four-week window. The four-week-
window premium is defined as: [(final offer price per share/target closing stock price four 
weeks prior to announcement) -1]x100 
 
 
 
SDC platinum 
Author’s 
computation 
 
 
                                                 
32 Note: The historical acquisition records are examined in the sample of all cross-border acquisitions from 1990 to 2008, including observations not 
included in our sample due to data availability. 
33 Note: The historical acquisition records are examined in the sample of all cross-border acquisitions from 1990 to 2008, including observations not 
included in our sample due to data availability. 
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Variable  Description Source 
Panel A: Continued 
LogPremium-1w Natural logarithm of premium calculated based on a one-week window. The one-week-window 
premium is defined as: [(final offer price per share/target closing stock price one week prior to 
announcement) -1]x100 
 
SDC platinum 
Author’s computation 
CompetingBidder Indicator variable that takes on a value of 1 if the bid is accompanied by multiple rival bids, and 
takes on 0 if otherwise. 
 
SDC platinum 
Author’s computation 
TenderOffer Indicator variable that takes on a value of 1 if the bid is a tender offer, and takes on 0 if 
otherwise. 
 
SDC platinum 
FinancialBuyer Indicator variable that takes on a value of 1 if the acquirer is a financial institution, and takes on 
0 if otherwise. 
 
SDC platinum 
Author’s computation 
Hostile Indicator variable that takes on a value of 1 if the attitude of the bidder is hostile or unfriendly, 
and takes on 0 if otherwise. 
 
SDC platinum 
Author’s computation 
CashBid Indicator variable that takes on a value of 1 if the bid is a cash bid (100% paid in cash), and 
takes on 0 if otherwise. 
 
SDC platinum 
Author’s computation 
Relatedness   Indicator variable that takes on a value of 1 if the acquirer firm and target firm are in the same 
industry or share the same 3-digit SIC code, and takes on 0 if otherwise. 
 
SDC platinum 
Author’s computation 
FullAcquisition Indicator variable that takes on a value of 1 if the percentage acquired by the acquirer is 100%, 
and takes on 0 if otherwise. 
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Variable  Description Source 
Panel B: Firm-level variables 
ROA_post  A proxy for acquirer's long-term post-acquisition operating performance. It measures the 
median ROA of the acquirer in the 3-year period following the acquisition completion year, 
where the ROA is calculated as EBITDA over total asset.  
COMPUSTAT Global  
Author's computation 
ROA_pre A proxy for acquirer's long-term pre-acquisition operating performance. It measures the 
median ROA of the acquirer in the 3-year period prior to the acquisition completion year, 
where the ROA is calculated as EBITDA over total asset. 
COMPUSTAT Global  
Author's computation 
TargetSize Natural log of target's net asset one year prior to announcement($ml) SDC platinum 
Author’s computation 
TargetProfit Target's net income/Net sales one year prior SDC platinum 
Author’s computation 
Panel C: Country-level variables 
ShareholderProtection An indicator for the level of shareholder protection in the target country. Following Rossi 
and Volpin (2004): it is equal to Anti-director rights multiplied by Rule of law divided by 10. 
The definition for Anti-director rights and Rule of law can be found in La Porta et al. (1998). 
 
Prof. Andrei Shleifer’s 
website 
CulturalDistance Calculated based on Hofstede’s four primary dimensions to assist in differentiating cultures: 
power distance, individualism, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance 
Prof. Geert Hofstede’s 
website 
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Table 1 Distribution of acquisitions originating from developing countries for targets in developed countries 
The columns represent the country of the acquirer’ ultimate parent company while the rows represent that of the target firms. The entries of the 
matrix are therefore the number of cross-border acquisitions originating from the acquiring country for firms in the target country. Our sample 
period is from 1990 to 2008. All acquirer countries are developing countries while all target countries are developed countries. 
 
Acquirer  
parent nation           Target nation           
  Australia Belgium Canada France Greece 
Hong 
Kong Japan 
New 
Zealand Norway 
United 
Kingdom 
United 
States Total 
Argentina 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 
Brazil 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
China 6 0 3 0 0 41 0 1 1 2 3 57 
Egypt 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
India 1 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 6 9 24 
Indonesia 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 
Kuwait 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 5 
Malaysia 9 0 0 0 0 8 0 1 2 6 7 33 
Mexico 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 10 13 
Morocco 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Philippines 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 3 0 7 
Russian Fed 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 5 12 
Saudi Arabia 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 2 9 
Singapore 17 0 0 0 0 21 4 4 0 5 18 69 
South Africa 23 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 5 41 
South Korea 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 2 0 12 21 
Thailand 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 
Trinidad&Tob 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
UAE 1 0 2 0 2 0 1 0 0 2 2 10 
Venezuela 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 
Total 66 2 20 3 2 72 10 6 8 47 86 322 
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Table 2 Distribution of the national pride bids and the foothold acquirers 
The columns represent the country of acquirers’ ultimate parent company while the rows represent the 
country of target firms. The entries of the matrix are therefore the number of cross-border acquisitions 
originating from the acquiring country for firms in the target country. Our sample is from 1990 to 2008. 
All acquiring countries are developing countries while all target countries are developed countries. Panel 
A presents the distribution of national pride bids while panel B presents the distribution of bids involved 
foothold acquirers. 
Panel A: National pride bids 
Acquirer 
parent 
nation 
Target nation 
Australia Belgium Canada 
Hong 
Kong Norway 
United 
Kingdom 
United 
States Total 
Brazil 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
China 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 4 
India 0 1 2 0 0 3 3 9 
Malaysia 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Mexico 1 0 0 0 0 1 4 6 
Philippines 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Singapore 1 0 0 1 0 0 4 6 
South Africa 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 
South Korea 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 
UAE 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Total 7 1 4 1 1 6 16 36 
 
Panel B:  Bids involved foothold acquirers 
Acquirer 
parent 
nation 
Target nation 
Australia Canada 
Hong 
Kong 
United 
Kingdom 
United 
States Total 
Brazil 0 1 0 0 0 1 
China 0 1 0 0 0 1 
India 0 0 0 1 1 2 
Malaysia 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Mexico 0 0 0 0 2 2 
Philippines 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Singapore 1 0 1 0 3 5 
South Africa 3 0 0 0 1 4 
South Korea 0 0 0 0 2 2 
UAE 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Total 6 2 1 2 9 20 
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Table 3 Chronological distribution of full sample  
This table presents the number of cross-border acquisitions of the full sample in chronological order, 
along with percentage and cumulative percentage.  
 
Year Freq. Percent Cum. 
1990 7 2.17 2.17 
1991 6 1.86 4.04 
1992 6 1.86 5.9 
1993 22 6.83 12.73 
1994 21 6.52 19.25 
1995 19 5.9 25.16 
1996 11 3.42 28.57 
1997 20 6.21 34.78 
1998 10 3.11 37.89 
1999 13 4.04 41.93 
2000 16 4.97 46.89 
2001 11 3.42 50.31 
2002 13 4.04 54.35 
2003 11 3.42 57.76 
2004 15 4.66 62.42 
2005 20 6.21 68.63 
2006 28 8.7 77.33 
2007 34 10.56 87.89 
2008 39 12.11 100 
Total 322 100  
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Table 4 Summary statistics 
This table presents the summary statistics for the dependent and independent variables in terms of the 
number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum, 25 percentile, 50 percentile, 75 percentile 
and maximum. Panel A presents the full sample and the subsample. The subsample (N=119) presents the 
testing sample for post-merger performance and the sample size decreases from 322 to 119 due to data 
unavailability. Panel B and C represent statistics for the national pride sample and the foothold acquirers 
sample, respectively. 
Panel A: Bids initiated from developing countries for targets in developed countries 
 
Variable N mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max 
Full Sample 
        LogPremium1w 288 3.07 1.17 -2.12 2.48 3.27 3.82 6.40 
LogPremium4w 322 3.15 1.14 -0.71 2.45 3.37 3.95 6.33 
NationalPride 322 0.11 0.32 0 0 0 0 1 
NP-FootholdAcquirer 322 0.06 0.24 0 0 0 0 1 
NP-NonFootholdAcquirer 322 0.05 0.22 0 0 0 0 1 
TargetSize 322 4.57 1.91 -0.36 3.23 4.58 5.83 10.19 
TargetProfit 322 -0.74 5.05 -61.54 -0.04 0.02 0.10 1.07 
CompetingBidder 322 0.02 0.15 0 0 0 0 1 
TenderOffer 322 0.36 0.48 0 0 0 1 1 
FinancialBuyer 322 0.11 0.32 0 0 0 0 1 
Hostile 322 0.02 0.14 0 0 0 0 1 
CashBid 322 0.61 0.49 0 0 1 1 1 
ShareholderProtection 322 4.33 0.64 0.00 4.00 4.11 5.00 5 
CulturalDistance 322 31.16 15.28 7.92 14.16 38.08 44.26 50.90 
         Sub Sample 
        ROA_post 119 10.64% 7.28% -4.36% 5.55% 9.90% 15.50% 42.83% 
NationalPride 119 0.2 0.4 0 0 0 0 1 
NP-FootholdAcquirer 119 0.12 0.32 0 0 0 0 1 
NP-NonFootholdAcquirer 119 0.08 0.28 0 0 0 0 1 
CompetingBidder 119 0.04 0.2 0 0 0 0 1 
Relatedness 119 0.46 0.5 0 0 0 1 1 
FullAcquisition 119 0.33 0.47 0 0 0 1 1 
ShareholderProtecion 119 4.3 0.72 0 4 4.11 5 5 
CulturalDistance 119 30.53 14.5 7.92 14.16 35.22 44.1 50.9 
ROA_pre 119 13.27% 8.97% -2.76% 6.64% 12.30% 19.34% 43.23% 
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Panel B: National pride bids 
Variable N mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max 
LogPremium-1w 34 3.43 0.86 0.57 3.04 3.51 4.06 5.12 
LogPremium-4w 36 3.63 0.67 1.8 3.42 3.75 4 5.05 
NP-FootholdAcquirer 36 0.56 0.5 0 0 1 1 1 
NP-NonFootholdAcquirer 36 0.44 0.5 0 0 0 1 1 
TargetSize 36 5.88 1.56 2.49 4.63 5.79 6.85 8.95 
TargetProfit 36 -0.03 0.39 -2.13 -0.01 0.04 0.11 0.29 
CompetingBidder 36 0.14 0.35 0 0 0 0 1 
TenderOffer 36 0.58 0.5 0 0 1 1 1 
FinancialBuyer 36 0.08 0.28 0 0 0 0 1 
Hostile 36 0.08 0.28 0 0 0 0 1 
CashBid 36 0.64 0.49 0 0 1 1 1 
ShareholderProtection 36 4.49 0.89 0 4.05 5 5 5 
CulturalDistance 36 35.1 11.06 12.07 28.68 41.07 44.15 48.48 
 
        
         
 
Panel C: Bids with foothold acquirers 
Variable N mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max 
LogPremium1w 18 3.4 0.68 1.98 3.02 3.44 3.89 4.45 
LogPremium4w 20 3.62 0.63 1.84 3.24 3.76 4.02 4.53 
TargetSize 20 5.71 1.61 2.49 4.7 5.37 7.08 8.73 
TargetProfit 20 0.01 0.18 -0.64 -0.01 0.04 0.11 0.19 
CompetingBidder 20 0.2 0.41 0 0 0 0 1 
TenderOffer 20 0.75 0.44 0 0.5 1 1 1 
FinancialBuyer 20 0.1 0.31 0 0 0 0 1 
Hostile 20 0.15 0.37 0 0 0 0 1 
CashBid 20 0.65 0.49 0 0 1 1 1 
ShareholderProtection 20 4.58 0.48 4 4 5 5 5 
CulturalDistance 20 34.03 13.29 12.07 21.42 41.07 44.26 48.48 
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Table 5 Pairwise Pearson correlation table 
Panel A: Full sample (N=322) ( Note: Correlation coefficients are showed above while the two-sided p-values are showed beneath.) 
No. Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 LogPremium-1w 1.00 
             
                2 LogPremium-4w 0.79 1.00 
            
  
0.00 
             3 NationalPride 0.11 0.15 1.00 
           
  
0.05 0.01 
            4 NP-FootholdAcquirer 0.07 0.11 0.73 1.00 
          
  
0.21 0.06 0.00 
           
5 
NP-
NonFootholdAcquirer 0.08 0.10 0.64 
-
0.06 1.00 
         
  
0.15 0.08 0.00 0.29 
          6 TargetSize -0.15 -0.10 0.24 0.15 0.18 1.00 
        
  
0.01 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.00 
         7 TargetProfit -0.03 -0.03 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.13 1.00 
       
  
0.65 0.56 0.37 0.50 0.59 0.02 
        8 CompetingBidder 0.10 0.11 0.29 0.31 0.06 0.16 0.02 1.00 
      
  
0.10 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.72 
       9 TenderOffer 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.21 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.20 1.00 
     
  
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.87 0.62 0.34 0.00 
      
10 FinancialBuyer -0.04 -0.08 
-
0.03 
-
0.01 -0.04 0.04 0.05 0.01 -0.06 1.00 
    
  
0.46 0.15 0.53 0.83 0.50 0.53 0.34 0.81 0.25 
     11 Hostile 0.03 0.05 0.17 0.25 -0.03 0.08 0.02 0.14 0.19 -0.05 1.00 
   
  
0.62 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.57 0.16 0.70 0.01 0.00 0.38 
    12 CashBid 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.29 -0.01 0.11 1.00 
  
  
0.68 0.76 0.71 0.71 0.90 0.06 0.11 0.18 0.00 0.84 0.05 
   13 ShareholderProtection 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.02 -0.05 -0.05 0.05 0.01 -0.18 0.03 0.02 1.00 
 
  
0.08 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.72 0.41 0.40 0.35 0.80 0.00 0.56 0.68 
  14 CulturalDistance 0.12 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.00 -0.08 0.06 0.02 0.13 0.06 0.11 0.25 1.00 
  
0.04 0.22 0.10 0.39 0.16 0.94 0.17 0.26 0.67 0.02 0.25 0.05 0.00 
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Panel B: Sub-sample (N=119 for tests of post-merger performance)  
No. Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 ROA_post 1 
         
            2 NationalPride 0.02 1 
        
  
-0.86 
         3 NP-FootholdAcquirer 0.04 0.73 1 
       
  
-0.64 0 
        4 NP-NonFootholdAcquirer -0.03 0.6 -0.11 1 
      
  
-0.78 0 -0.23 
       5 CompetingBidder 0.1 0.31 0.31 0.09 1 
     
  
-0.27 0 0 -0.34 
      6 Relatedness 0.08 0.04 -0.02 0.08 -0.03 1 
    
  
-0.4 -0.68 -0.79 -0.37 -0.78 
     7 FullAcquisition 0.17 0.41 0.25 0.3 0.3 0.18 1 
   
  
-0.06 0 -0.01 0 0 -0.05 
    8 ShareholderProtecion 0.21 0.08 0.12 -0.02 0.06 -0.18 0.26 1 
  
  
-0.02 -0.38 -0.21 -0.85 -0.5 -0.05 0 
   9 CulturalDistance 0.14 0.14 0.09 0.1 0.07 -0.26 0.12 0.21 1 
 
  
-0.12 -0.13 -0.33 -0.29 -0.45 0 -0.19 -0.02 
  10 ROA_pre 0.58 0.18 0.12 0.13 0.23 0.1 0.14 -0.07 0.12 1 
  
0 -0.04 -0.19 -0.17 -0.01 -0.29 -0.14 -0.43 -0.21 
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Table 6 Regression results for acquisition premium and national pride  
This table presents the results for OLS regressions of the full sample of 322 cross-border acquisitions originating from 
developing countries for targets in developed countries. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of premiums. In column 
(1) and (2), the premium is calculated based on a four-week window. In column (3) and (4), the premium is calculated based on a 
one-week window. The independent variables include: NationalPride, a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if the national 
pride characteristic is identified through media search on Factiva, and 0 otherwise; TargetSize, natural logarithm of targets’ net 
asset one year prior to announcement ($ml); TargetProfit, targets’ net income over net sales one year prior to announcement; 
CompetingBidder, a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if the bid is accompanied by multiple rival bids, and 0 otherwise; 
TenderOffer, a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if the bid is a tender offer, and 0 otherwise; FinancialBuyer, a dummy 
variable that takes on a value of 1 if the acquirer is a financial institution, and 0 otherwise; Hostile, a dummy variable that takes 
on a value of 1 if the bid is hostile or unfriendly, and 0 otherwise; CashBid, a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if the bid 
is a cash bid (cash 100%), and 0 otherwise. At the country level, we control for target countries’ shareholder protection level, 
which is equal to Anti-director rights multiplied by Rule of law divided by 10 from La Porta et al. (1998). Another country-level 
control is the cultural distance between the target country and the acquirer country based on Hofstede’s four primary dimensions 
of cultural distance. All standard errors are robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 
10% respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES LogPremiu
m-4w 
LogPremiu
m-4w 
LogPremiu
m-1w 
LogPremiu
m-1w 
     
NationalPride 0.4086** 0.3836** 0.3829* 0.3754* 
 (0.1770) (0.1773) (0.2021) (0.2018) 
TargetSize -0.0683* -0.0685* -0.0967* -0.0996** 
 (0.0413) (0.0411) (0.0503) (0.0505) 
TargetProfit -0.0054 -0.0031 -0.0032 -0.0011 
 (0.0085) (0.0086) (0.0059) (0.0060) 
CompetingBidder 0.5517** 0.5562** 0.3970 0.3881 
 (0.2266) (0.2296) (0.2566) (0.2595) 
TenderOffer 0.2129 0.1983 0.3386** 0.3363** 
 (0.1571) (0.1559) (0.1569) (0.1569) 
FinancialBuyer -0.1819 -0.2485 -0.0531 -0.1171 
 (0.2123) (0.2219) (0.1931) (0.1971) 
Hostile 0.1544 0.1347 -0.0522 -0.0875 
 (0.2205) (0.2229) (0.2269) (0.2267) 
CashBid -0.0556 -0.0843 -0.0273 -0.0450 
 (0.1459) (0.1464) (0.1524) (0.1530) 
ShareholderProtecion 0.2388** 0.2033** 0.1417 0.1041 
 (0.1035) (0.1033) (0.1043) (0.1073) 
CulturalDistance  0.0074  0.0069 
  (0.0046)  (0.0048) 
Constant 3.4969*** 3.4690*** 3.3559*** 3.3391*** 
 (0.7010) (0.6974) (0.5722) (0.5692) 
     
Observations 322 322 288 288 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0542 0.0595 0.0504 0.0539 
Industry Control YES YES YES YES 
Year Control YES YES NO NO 
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Table 7 Regression results for acquisition premium and foothold / non-foothold characteristics 
This table presents the results for OLS regressions of the full sample of 322 cross-border acquisitions originating from 
developing countries for targets in developed countries. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of premiums. In column 
(1) and (2), the premium is calculated based on a four-week window. In column (3) and (4), the premium is calculated based on a 
one-week window. The independent variables include: NP-FootholdAcquirer, a dummy variable takes on a value of 1 if the 
acquirer has completed at least one acquisition in the target country prior to the national-pride-driven acquisition; NP-
NonFootholdAcquirer, a dummy variable takes on a value of 1 if the acquirer has NOT completed any acquisition in the target 
country prior to the national-pride-driven acquisition; TargetSize, natural logarithm of targets’ net asset one year prior to 
announcement ($ml); TargetProfit, targets’ net income over net sales one year prior to announcement; CompetingBidder, a 
dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if the bid is accompanied by multiple rival bids, and 0 otherwise; TenderOffer, a 
dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if the bid is a tender offer, and 0 otherwise; FinancialBuyer, a dummy variable that 
takes on a value of 1 if the acquirer is a financial institution, and 0 otherwise; Hostile, a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 
if the bid is hostile or unfriendly, and 0 otherwise; CashBid, a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if the bid is a cash bid 
(cash 100%), and 0 otherwise. At the country level, we control for target countries’ shareholder protection level, which is equal to 
Anti-director rights multiplied by Rule of law divided by 10 from La Porta et al. (1998). Another country-level control is the 
cultural distance between the target country and the acquirer country based on Hofstede’s four primary dimensions of cultural 
distance. All standard errors are robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES LogPremiu
m-4w 
LogPremi
um-4w 
LogPremiu
m-1w 
LogPremiu
m-1w 
     
NP-FootholdAcquirer 0.1918 0.1765 0.0364 0.2098 
 (0.1971) (0.1955) (0.2357) (0.2299) 
NP-NonFootholdAcquirer 0.6527** 0.6177** 0.5492* 0.5450* 
 (0.2694) (0.2730) (0.3235) (0.2880) 
TargetSize -0.0696* -0.0698* -0.0929* -0.1012** 
 (0.0413) (0.0411) (0.0490) (0.0507) 
TargetProfit -0.0057 -0.0034 -0.0060 -0.0012 
 (0.0085) (0.0086) (0.0082) (0.0061) 
CompetingBidder 0.6479*** 0.6482*** 0.7292** 0.4515* 
 (0.2248) (0.2281) (0.3358) (0.2513) 
TenderOffer 0.2249 0.2102 0.2277 0.3490** 
 (0.1571) (0.1558) (0.1682) (0.1562) 
FinancialBuyer -0.1698 -0.2356 -0.0929 -0.1067 
 (0.2137) (0.2235) (0.2256) (0.1988) 
Hostile 0.2419 0.2189 0.2257 -0.0268 
 (0.2235) (0.2300) (0.2817) (0.2434) 
CashBid -0.0591 -0.0871 -0.0218 -0.0473 
 (0.1462) (0.1467) (0.1689) (0.1533) 
ShareholderProtecion 0.2419** 0.2070** 0.1678 0.1113 
 (0.1047) (0.1044) (0.1170) (0.1099) 
CulturalDistance  0.0073  0.0067 
  (0.0046)  (0.0048) 
Constant 3.4848*** 3.4580*** 3.6153*** 3.3134*** 
 (0.7001) (0.6981) (0.8578) (0.5769) 
     
Observations 322 322 288 288 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0550 0.0599 0.0487 0.0525 
Industry Control YES YES YES YES 
Year Control YES YES YES NO 
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Table 8 Robustness test for acquisition premium and foothold / non-foothold characteristics under 
country classification by IMF 
This table presents the results for OLS regressions of the sub sample of 232 cross-border acquisitions using the IMF country 
classification. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of premiums calculated based on a four-week window. The 
independent variables include: NP-FootholdAcquirer, a dummy variable takes on a value of 1 if the acquirer has completed at 
least one acquisition in the target country prior to the national-pride-driven acquisition; NP-NonFootholdAcquirer, a dummy 
variable takes on a value of 1 if the acquirer has NOT completed any acquisition in the target country prior to the national-pride-
driven acquisition; TargetSize, the natural logarithm of targets’ net asset one year prior to announcement ($ml); TargetProfit, 
targets’ net income over net sales one year prior to announcement;. CompetingBidder is a dummy variable that takes on a value 
of 1 if the bid is accompanied by multiple rival bids, and 0 otherwise; TenderOffer, a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if 
the bid is a tender offer, and 0 otherwise; FinancialBuyer, a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if the acquirer is a 
financial institution, and 0 otherwise; Hostile, a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if the bid is hostile or unfriendly, and 0 
otherwise; CashBid, a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if the bid is a cash bid (cash 100%), and 0 otherwise. At the 
country level, we control for target countries’ shareholder protection level, which is equal to Anti-director rights multiplied by 
Rule of law divided by 10 from La Porta et al. (1998). Another country-level control is the cultural distance between the target 
country and the acquirer country based on Hofstede’s four primary dimensions of cultural distance. All standard errors are robust 
standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES LogPremi
um-4w 
LogPremiu
m-4w 
   
NP-FootholdAcquirer 0.2120 0.2256 
 (0.2489) (0.2506) 
NP-NonFootholdAcquirer 0.5745** 0.5187** 
 (0.2393) (0.2349) 
TargetSize -0.0488 -0.0494 
 (0.0417) (0.0416) 
TargetProfit -0.0039 -0.0014 
 (0.0078) (0.0077) 
CompetingBidder 0.4201** 0.3653** 
 (0.1824) (0.1813) 
TenderOffer 0.4629*** 0.4733*** 
 (0.1518) (0.1503) 
FinancialBuyer 0.0508 -0.0340 
 (0.2770) (0.2856) 
Hostile -0.0348 -0.0934 
 (0.2306) (0.2498) 
CashBid -0.1368 -0.1533 
 (0.1628) (0.1627) 
ShareholderProtecion 0.1024 0.0489 
 (0.0895) (0.0902) 
CulturalDistance  0.0086* 
  (0.0044) 
Constant 2.8573*** 2.8620*** 
 (0.4595) (0.4484) 
   
Observations 232 232 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0366 0.0459 
Industry Control NO NO 
Year Control NO NO 
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Table 9 Regression results for acquisition premium and past acquisition experience (number of 
acquisitions or number of years) 
This table presents the results for OLS regressions of the subsample of 36 national-pride-driven 
acquisitions. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of premium calculated based on a four-week 
window. The independent variables include: Experience(AcqNo.), the number of acquisitions completed 
in the same target country prior to the national-pride-driven acquisition; Experience(Years), the number 
of years between the first acquisition in the target country and the national-pride-driven acquisition; 
TargetSize, the natural logarithm of targets’ net asset one year prior to announcement ($ml); 
CompetingBidder, a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if the bid is accompanied by multiple rival 
bids, and 0 otherwise; TenderOffer, a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if the bid is a tender offer, 
and 0 otherwise. At the country level, we control for target countries’ shareholder protection level, which 
is equal to Anti-director rights multiplied by Rule of law divided by 10 from La Porta et al. (1998). 
Another country-level control is the cultural distance between the target country and the acquirer country 
based on Hofstede’s four primary dimensions of cultural distance. All standard errors are robust standard 
errors in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES LogPremiu
m-4w 
LogPremiu
m-4w 
LogPremiu
m-4w 
    
Experience(AcqNo.) -0.0286*  -0.0337** 
 (0.0164)  (0.0132) 
Experience(Years)  -0.0157 0.0104 
  (0.0295) (0.0201) 
TargetSize 0.0023 0.0020 0.0019 
 (0.0582) (0.0624) (0.0590) 
CompetingBidder 0.4620** 0.4703** 0.4668** 
 (0.1926) (0.1848) (0.1934) 
TenderOffer -0.2236 -0.1997 -0.2381 
 (0.2691) (0.2573) (0.2600) 
ShareholderProtecion 0.0703 0.0594 0.0691 
 (0.1110) (0.1114) (0.1132) 
CulturalDistance -0.0053 -0.0054 -0.0054 
 (0.0078) (0.0076) (0.0078) 
Constant 3.6147*** 3.6304*** 3.6167*** 
 (0.5505) (0.5697) (0.5597) 
    
Observations 36 36 36 
    
Adjusted R-Squared -0.0836 -0.1198 -0.1199 
Industry Control NO NO NO 
Year Control NO NO NO 
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Table 10 Univarite test of the difference in the level of future acquisition activity between the high-
premium and low-premium group of national pride acquirers  
This table presents the univariate test results for the difference in participation of future acquisitions between high-
premium group and low-premium group of national pride acquirers. Both the number of acquisitions completed and 
the value of acquisitions (in million dollars) are measured in the same target country as well as in all developed 
countries during the six-year period following acquisition completion year. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
 
Mean Low premium group High premium group p value of T test 
Number of 
acquisitions in the 
same target country 1.16 3.11 0.1698 
Number of 
acquisitions in all 
developed countries 3.17 8.33 0.0473** 
Transaction value in 
the same target 
country($mil) 46.9565 864.0296 0.0635* 
Transaction value in 
all developed 
countries($mil) 1238.17 3828.214 0.1537 
   
 67 
 
Table 11  Regression results for post-acquisition operating performance and national pride  
This table presents the results for OLS regressions of the sub sample of 119 cross-border acquisitions. The 
dependent variable is ROA_post, the median ROA of the acquirer in the 3-year period following the acquisition 
completion year, where the ROA is calculated as EBITDA over total asset. The independent variables include: 
NationalPride, a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if the national pride characteristic is identified through 
media search on Factiva, and 0 otherwise; CompetingBidder, a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if the bid 
is accompanied by multiple rival bids, and 0 otherwise; Relatedness, a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if 
the acquirer and the target shares the same 3-digit SIC code, and 0 otherwise; Full Acquisition, a dummy variable 
that takes on a value of 1 if the percentage acquired by the acquirer is 100%, and 0 otherwise; Shareholder 
Protection of the target country, equal to Anti-director rights multiplied by Rule of law divided by 10 from La Porta 
et al. (1998); Cultural Distance between the target country and the acquirer country, calculated based on Hofstede’s 
four primary dimensions of cultural distance; ROA_pre, the median ROA of the acquirer in the 3-year period prior 
to the acquisition completion year, where the ROA is calculated as EBITDA over total asset. All standard errors are 
robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ROA_post ROA_post ROA_post ROA_post 
     
NationalPride -0.0267* -0.0310* -0.0201* -0.0315** 
 (0.0158) (0.0169) (0.0116) (0.0149) 
CompetingBidder -0.0107 -0.0060 0.0044 0.0020 
 (0.0202) (0.0231) (0.0267) (0.0202) 
Relatedness 0.0100 0.0064 0.0112 0.0034 
 (0.0103) (0.0114) (0.0116) (0.0138) 
FullAcquisition 0.0116 0.0221 -0.0035 0.0101 
 (0.0165) (0.0182) (0.0166) (0.0178) 
ShareholderProtecion 0.0258*** 0.0264*** 0.0281*** 0.0309*** 
 (0.0052) (0.0080) (0.0059) (0.0083) 
CulturalDistance 0.0002 0.0002 0.0006 -0.0000 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) 
ROA_pre 0.4958*** 0.4668*** 0.5133*** 0.5112*** 
 (0.0592) (0.0794) (0.0710) (0.0828) 
Constant -0.0801*** -0.0890** -0.0956*** -0.1003** 
 (0.0254) (0.0382) (0.0340) (0.0450) 
     
Observations 119 119 83 83 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3921 0.4161 0.4982 0.5449 
Industry Control NO NO YES NO 
Year Control NO YES NO YES 
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Table 12 Regression results for post-acquisition operating performance and foothold / non-foothold 
characteristics 
This table presents the results for OLS regressions of the sub sample of 119 cross-border acquisitions. The 
dependent variable is ROA_post, the median ROA of the acquirer in the 3-year period following the acquisition 
completion year, where the ROA is calculated as EBITDA over total asset. The independent variables include: NP-
FootholdAcquirer, a dummy variable takes on a value of 1 if the acquirer has completed at least one acquisition in 
the target country prior to the national-pride-driven acquisition; NP-NonFootholdAcquirer, a dummy variable takes 
on a value of 1 if the acquirer has NOT completed any acquisition in the target country prior to the national-pride-
driven acquisition; CompetingBidder, a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if the bid is accompanied by 
multiple rival bids, and 0 otherwise; Relatedness, a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if the acquirer and the 
target shares the same 3-digit SIC code, and 0 otherwise; Full Acquisition, a dummy variable that takes on a value of 
1 if the percentage acquired by the acquirer is 100%, and 0 otherwise; Shareholder Protection of the target country, 
equal to Anti-director rights multiplied by Rule of law divided by 10 from La Porta et al. (1998); Cultural Distance 
between the target country and the acquirer country, calculated based on Hofstede’s four primary dimensions of 
cultural distance; ROA_pre, the median ROA of the acquirer in the 3-year period prior to the acquisition completion 
year, where the ROA is calculated as EBITDA over total asset. All standard errors are robust standard errors in 
parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ROA_post ROA_post ROA_post ROA_post 
     
NP-FootholdAcquirer -0.0194 -0.0244 -0.0043 -0.0059 
 (0.0179) (0.0213) (0.0159) (0.0162) 
NP-NonFootholdAcquirer -0.0371* -0.0392** -0.0353** -0.0331** 
 (0.0196) (0.0195) (0.0156) (0.0165) 
CompetingBidder -0.0140 -0.0098 -0.0014 -0.0067 
 (0.0199) (0.0239) (0.0249) (0.0243) 
Relatedness 0.0102 0.0074 0.0096 -0.0017 
 (0.0103) (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0116) 
FullAcquisition 0.0128 0.0231 -0.0015 -0.0088 
 (0.0166) (0.0181) (0.0172) (0.0220) 
ShareholderProtecion 0.0252*** 0.0261*** 0.0274*** 0.0282*** 
 (0.0054) (0.0082) (0.0063) (0.0070) 
CulturalDistance 0.0003 0.0002 0.0006 0.0003 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) 
ROA_pre 0.4969*** 0.4664*** 0.5213*** 0.5428*** 
 (0.0600) (0.0796) (0.0697) (0.0694) 
Constant -0.0783*** -0.0881** -0.1058*** -0.0764** 
 (0.0261) (0.0389) (0.0343) (0.0365) 
     
Observations 119 119 83 83 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3896 0.4119 0.5001 0.4768 
Industry Control NO NO YES NO 
Year Control NO YES NO YES 
 
